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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that The Supreme Court 
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and 
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law," and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(c), which provides that the Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
"discipline of lawyers." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the decision of the Ethics and Discipline Committee to impose 
a public reprimand correct? 
2. Did the Ethics and Discipline Committee reasonably protect Mr. 
Nemelka's due process rights? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of attorney discipline cases is that the Court 
reviews the findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard reserving the 
right to draw different inferences from the facts and make an independent 
determination as to the correctness of the discipline actually imposed.1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Rule 14-510, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and Rules 14-603-
607 Standards of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The rules are set forth 
verbatim in Appellee's Addendum. 
1
 Appellee's Addendum (000001-000006). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review of the decision of the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee for the Supreme Court ("Ethics and Discipline 
Committee") to sanction Richard Nemelka by imposing a public reprimand for 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Course of Proceedings: On June 14, 2007, a Screening Panel of the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee ("Screening Panel") heard evidence regarding a 
Complaint against Mr. Nemelka filed by Tina Simmons Pugh. The Screening 
Panel found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Nemelka had violated 
several of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that he receive 
a public reprimand. The Screening Panel Chair issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand on 
June 29, 2007.2 
Mr. Nemelka filed an Exception to the Findings on July 19, 2007. On April 
24, 2008, the Exception Hearing was held. Art Berger, Chair of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee delegated his authority to hear the Exception to Bruce 
Maak, Chair of Screening Panel B.3 After reviewing the Screening Panel record 
and hearing argument from Mr. Nemelka and the OPC, Mr. Maak found that Mr. 
Nemelka had failed to carry his burden under Rule 14-510(c) of showing that the 
Screening Panel's recommendation of public discipline should be overturned 
2
 Appellant's Addendum "D." 
3
 Appellee's Addendum (000009-000010). (Mr. Maak is Chair of Screening Panel B1 which is a 
different screening panel than B2, the Screening Panel that heard the original evidence). 
2 
even though he found that two of the rule violations were not supported by 
substantial evidence. In other words, Mr. Nemelka had not met his burden of 
showing that the recommendation to publically reprimand him was 
"unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and 
otherwise clearly erroneous."4 
On May 23, 2008 Mr. Nemelka filed a Petition for Review with the Utah 
Supreme Court requesting review of an administrative action. The Court by sua 
sponte motion dismissed the petition. On June 19, 2008 Mr. Nemelka filed his 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief which the Court granted. On July 23, 2008 the 
Court ordered the parties to brief their respective positions. 
Disposition at Trial Court or Agency: On May 13, 2008, Mr. Nemelka 
received a Public Reprimand from the Ethics and Discipline Committee. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Mr. Nemelka was notified that a Screening Panel Hearing would be held 
with respect to a complaint filed against him by Tina Simmons Pugh, a former 
client of his. The OPC presented the results of its investigation to the Screening 
Panel which included all of the documents provided to the OPC by both Mr. 
Nemelka and Ms. Pugh. Mr. Nemelka testified at the Hearing, but called no 
witnesses. Ms. Pugh was also present and testified at the Screening Panel 
Hearing. Upon considering the evidence the Screening Panel found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Nemelka had violated the following 
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 
1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating 
_ 
3 
Representation); and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct).5 The Screening Panel also 
considered and found that several aggravating circumstances applied pursuant 
to Rule 14-607 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions including: (a) a 
pattern of misconduct; (b) multiple offenses; (c) refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or to the 
disciplinary authority; (d) vulnerability of the victim; and (e) Mr. Nemelka's 
substantial experience in the practice of law.6 
The Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Nemelka receive a Public 
Reprimand based upon its findings of the facts and application of the aggravating 
factors. The Screening Panel Chair issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand on June 29, 2007. 
As provided for in the rules, Mr. Nemelka filed an Exception to the 
Findings and requested that a hearing be held. 7 At the Exception Hearing, Mr. 
Nemelka, for the first time, requested that he be allowed to cross-examine Ms. 
Pugh although Mr. Nemelka had not notified the OPC or Ms. Pugh that he was 
requesting her presence.8 Mr. Nemelka then submitted a subpoena that had not 
been issued by the district court according to the rules.9 Mr. Nemelka also 
brought a witness to testify at the Exception Hearing when that witness had not 
5
 Appellant's Addendum "D" at 2. 
6
 Id. at 4. 
7
 Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010). 
8
 Mr. Nemelka attached a copy of the subpoena he apparently tried to serve. See Appellant's 
Addendum "B". 
9
 Rule 14-503(g) of the RLDD states, u[a]ny party or a screening panel, for good cause shown, 
may petition under seal the district court for issuance of a subpoena, subpoena duces tecum or 
any order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal complaint. See Appellee's Addendum 
000012. 
4 
testified at the Screening Panel Hearing. 
Mr. Maak considered these two issues at the outset of the hearing. Mr. 
Maak denied the request to allow Mr. Nemelka's witness to testify because he 
should have testified at the Screening Panel Hearing.10 With respect to cross-
examining the complainant, Mr. Maak stated, "if Respondent had wished to 
cross-examine Complainant at this hearing, he should have made note of that 
fact when he filed his Exception."11 
Mr. Maak issued the Ruling on Exception to Screening Panel 
Recommendation of Discipline on April 29, 2008. He found that Mr. Nemelka 
had failed to carry his burden under Rule 14-510(c) that the Screening Panel's 
recommendation of public discipline should be overturned.12 The Order of 
Discipline: Public Reprimand was signed by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee on May 13, 2008. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument I. The issuance of a public reprimand was correct in this case 
because there was substantial evidence presented that Mr. Nemelka violated 
several of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that numerous aggravating 
factors applied. The Screening Panel correctly applied the Standards of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability to the facts of this case taking into consideration all of 
the evidence presented. Mr. Nemelka has failed to marshal all of the facts 
necessary for this Court to review those facts and draw any different inferences 
10
 Appellant's Addendum "E". 
11
 Id. 
12
 Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010). 
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and, therefore the Court should hold that the Committees' determination was not 
clearly erroneous. 
Mr. Nemelka has also had the Screening Panel recommendation reviewed 
at an Exception Hearing. Mr. Maak, who presided over the Exception Hearing, 
found that the Screening Panel's findings and recommendation were correct. In 
reviewing that decision within the Standards of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, 
the Court shall also determine that a Public Reprimand is the correct sanction in 
this case. 
Argument II. Mr. Nemelka was not denied due process when he was 
unable to cross examine the Ms. Pugh because Mr. Nemelka had notice of the 
hearing and could have either notified the OPC of his intent to have Ms. Pugh be 
present or he could have obtained a correctly issued subpoena with time enough 
to enforce the subpoena for non compliance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUSANCE OF A PUBLIC REPRIMAND WAS CORRECT 
A. The Ethics and Discipline Committee's Findings Of Fact Are Not 
Clearly Erroneous. 
In reviewing attorney discipline cases, this Court will review the trial court's 
finding of facts under the clearly erroneous standard, reserving the right to draw 
different inferences from the facts.13 While the standard necessarily applies to 
"trial court's" findings, the OPC submits that this is the appropriate standard for 
cases such as this one where the Court reviews the decision of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee. The Court may draw its own inferences from the facts in 
6 
the record as a whole. In order for the Court to draw its own inferences, 
however, Mr. Nemelka must bring all of the facts before the Court. Mr. Nemelka 
must marshal the facts supporting his arguments on appeal and also those that 
do not support his arguments so that the Court may make its own inferences. 
The actual facts found by the Screening Panel were the following: (a) Mr. 
Nemelka was hired by Tina Simmons Pugh to represent her in divorce 
proceedings; (b) Mr. Nemelka provided opposing counsel with his client's 
unedited personal notes attached to his discovery responses; (c) Ms. Simmons 
Pugh's confidential material was attached without her consent; (d) Mr. Nemelka 
failed to provide discovery requests to his client before the deadline to respond 
had passed and that this failure subjected his client to a Motion to Compel; (e) 
Mr. Nemelka refused to promptly provide his client with a copy of her file after 
she terminated representation; and (f) Mr. Nemelka later requested that his client 
personally appear at his office to pick up file and that at that time Ms. Simmons 
Pugh was served with a complaint for unpaid attorney's fees.14 
The Screening Panel had before it documents supporting the complaint 
against Mr. Nemelka as well as documents that he provided to the Panel in his 
own defense. Based upon its review of the documents and the testimony of both 
Mr. Nemelka and Ms. Pugh, the Screening Panel found that Mr. Nemelka 
violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct during his representation of 
Ms. Pugh, The Screening Panel found that Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 1.3 by 
" Appellee's Addendum (000014-000021). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 883 (Utah 2001), see 
also, In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998); In re Babilis, 951 P 2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997). 
14
 Appellant's Addendum UD" at 2. 
7 
"failing to provide timely response to discovery requests and by subjecting his 
client to an unnecessary Motion to Compel."15 The Screening Panel found that 
Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 16 by "providing his client's unedited personal notes 
as discovery responses with confidential material attached without his client's 
consent."16 
The Screening Panel found that Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 1.16(d) by 
"refusing to promptly provide his client with a copy of her file after she terminated 
the representation and then having his client come to his office to retrieve the file 
so he could serve her with a Complaint for collection of his fees."17 Mr. Nemelka 
violated Rule 8.4(a), according to the Screening Panel, by violating the other 
Rules of Professional Conduct.18 
The Panel found that Mr. Nemelka's misconduct was substantial enough 
to recommend a Public Reprimand. Rule 14-605(c) of the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions states that a public reprimand is generally appropriate when "a 
lawyer negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, 
the public, or the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding . . 
,."
19
 The Panel also found that aggravating factors applied to Mr. Nemelka as 
follows: 
1. A pattern of misconduct; 
2. Multiple offenses; 
15
 Appellant's Addendum "D" at 3. 
16
 Id 
17
 Appellant's Addendum "D" at 4. 
18
 Id 
19
 Appellee's Addendum (000023). 
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3. Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, 
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
4. Vulnerability of victim; 
5. Substantial experience ih the practice of law.20 
The crux of Mr. Nemelka's argument with respect to the facts is that the 
Screening Panel failed to find by a preponderance of the evidence in his favor, 
Mr. Nemelka wants this Court to consider only the facts that would support his 
side of the story and overturn the Ethics Committee's decision. For example, Mr. 
Nemelka states as fact that "[t]he Screening Panel found that Petitioner had 
attached Ms. Pugh's written responses to interrogatories (Addendum A) to the 
formal answer without her consent and that the same was a disclosure of 
confidential material even though Ms. Pugh reviewed the formal answers to 
interrogatories which contained her written responses and then signed the 
same."21 The first point about Mr. Nemelka's statement is that it contains 
opinions and conclusions. Secondly, Mr. Nemelka suggests that the one 
document he provided as Addendum A was the only document attached to the 
Interrogatories. It was not. There were numerous other documents attached 
which the Screening Panel found contained confidential information.22 
In reviewing the facts under the clearly erroneous standard, the Court 
must look at all of the facts found below. The Court may draw different 
inferences from facts, however, Mr. Nemelka is still required to marshal the facts 
on both sides so that this Court may review the entire record as the Screening 
Panel had before it. 
21
 Appellant's Brief at 4. 
22
 Appellee's Addendum (000026-000051). 
9 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding."23 This Court has said that in order to pass this threshold, 
"parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."24 
The Court warned that when parties fail to fulfill the marshalling requirement, the 
Court may "rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings in fact."25 
In this appeal, Mr. Nemelka falls woefully short of meeting this marshalling 
requirement. His statement of facts is not really a statement of facts, but rather 
his opinions and conclusions about the record, Mr. Nemelka has also failed to 
provide all of the documents that were submitted to the Screening Panel and 
upon which it rendered it's decision that Mr. Nemelka violated the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. That being the case, it is impossible for this Court to draw 
its own inferences and the Court must rely upon the finder of fact in the case. 
B. The Imposition of a Public Reprimand was the Appropriate Sanction 
Given Mr, Nemelka's Conduct. 
Following the issuance of the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Mr. 
Nemelka afforded himself of the opportunity of having that determination 
reviewed by filing an Exception and requesting an Exception Hearing. Overall, 
according to Mr. Bruce Maak, who presided over the hearing, the 
" Appellee's Addendum (000052-000055). 
24
 Appellee's Addendum (000056-000064); United Park v. Stichting, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 
2006). 
25
 Id. at 1207. 
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recommendation of a Public Reprimand was correct and Mr. Nemelka has not 
met his burden of showing that the Public Reprimand was arbitrary, capricious 
not supported by substantial evidence and otherwise an abuse of discretion.26 
Prior to the Exception Hearing, Mr. Maak reviewed the entire record that 
had been presented at the Screening Panel hearing and also reviewed the 
Screening Panel video tape. Mr. Maak found that that there was not sufficient 
evidence in the record to uphold two of the rule violations found by the Screening 
Panel. Even so, the other four Rule violations were substantially supported by the 
evidence in the record and, in light of the aggravating factors, the Public 
Reprimand was still the appropriate sanction.27 
Specifically, Mr. Maak found; (a) the fact that Complainant "signed the 
interrogatory answers does not necessarily establish that she intended the notes 
to be attached verbatim - she may have expected [Mr. Nemelka] to draft 
appropriate attachments, which is what Complainant said was to occur. The 
Screening Panel accepted Complainant's version of things, and [Mr. Nemelka] 
has not carried hrs burden on this point to show that its recommendation was 
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and 
otherwise clearly erroneous;"28 (b) there was "substantial evidence supporting the 
Screening Panel's decision that [Mr. Nemelka] did not timely supply Complainant 
with a copy of her file upon her request, which is not necessarily dependent upon 
Appellant's Addendum "E". 
11 
the Court formally granting a Motion to Withdraw. Because [Mr. Nemelka] had, 
according to Complainant, previously purported to withdraw and refused to 
communicate further with her about her case, it was incumbent upon [Mr. 
Nemelka] promptly to make available her file or at least a copy thereof so that 
she could obtain other counsel and participate in the proceedings and not await 
the Court's order allowing [Mr. Nemelka's] withdrawal. [Mr. Nemelka] has 
therefore not carried his burden under Rule 14-510(c)."29 
Even though Mr. Maak also found that "the record did not support the 
Screening Panel's findings of violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3" he determined that 
overall this finding did not "under Rule 14-510(c) render improper the 
recommendation of public discipline based on the other grounds addressed [in 
the ruling]."30 On review, Mr. Maak considered the record thoroughly and found 
that two of the rule violations were not supported. Even so, Mr. Maak found that 
the recommendation for a Public Reprimand was correct in light of the facts in 
the record, the standards and aggravating factors. 
In imposing the appropriate sanction the Screening Panel had considered 
the following rules: 
Rule 14-605(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate 
when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law.31 
29
 Id. at 7. 
30
 Id. at 8. 
31
 Appellee's Addendum (000023). 
12 
Rule 14-607(a) After misconduct has been established, 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered and 
weighed in deciding what sanction to impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree 
of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may 
include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally 
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.32 
"Respondent's Exception to the recommendation of discipline of the 
Screening Panel is denied. Respondent has failed to carry his burden to 
establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the Screening Panel's recommendation of 
public discipline should be overturned."33 
Under the second prong of the standard for review of attorney discipline 
cases, this Court will make a determination of the correctness of the sanction 
imposed. In fact, this Court has said that it is required constitutionally to make 
an independent determination as to the correctness of the discipline imposed.34 
In reviewing the record and applying the Standards along with the aggravating 
32
 Id. 
33
 Appellant's Addendum "E" at 8. 
34
 Appellee's Addendum (000014-000021). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d at 883-884; citing Ince, 957 
) OW of <*OQC P.2d at 1236. 
13 
circumstances, the Court should determine that a Public Reprimand is the correct 
sanction for Mr. Nemelka's misconduct. 
A Public Reprimand is appropriate based on Mr. Nemelka's violation of 
Rules 1.6, 1.16 and 8.4(a). Mr. Nemelka's violation of Rule 1.6 is based on the 
factual finding that he attached Ms. Pugh's confidential information to Answers to 
Interrogatories without her permission. Mr. Nemelka did not prepare Answers 
based upon the proposed answers provided by his client, but simply attached her 
answers with handwritten notes to him and cross-outs that still revealed the 
information she wanted kept out.35 Moreover, Mr. Nemelka attached all of the 
documents Ms. Pugh sent for his review, including documents that were found by 
the Screening Panel to be confidential. Notably, Mr. Nemelka's Addendum does 
not include the full compliment of documents which he attached to the Answers 
to Interrogatories.36 
Mr. Nemelka also violated Rule 1.16 when he refused to return Ms. Pugh's 
file after his services were terminated. He then requested Ms. Pugh come to his 
office to pick up the file and when she did served her with a Complaint in his debt 
collection against her. Rule 1.16 requires attorneys to protect their client's rights 
when they withdraw or are terminated. It requires that attorneys promptly return 
the client's file. Mr. Nemelka did neither of those. Mr. Nemelka violated Rule 
8.4(a) when he violated the other Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions require a Public Reprimand 
be imposed when misconduct is negligent and causes harm. In this case the 
35
 See Appellant's Addendum at "A". 
36
 See Appellee's Addendum at (000026-000051). 
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client was harmed and the legal system was harmed. Thus a Public Reprimand 
would be the presumptive discipline to impose. Moreover, in Mr. Nemelka's 
case, the Screening Panel assigned several aggravating circumstances that 
applied in Mr. Nemelka's case. With the addition and consideration of numerous 
aggravating circumstances along with a presumption that the correct discipline is 
a Public Reprimand, the Ethics Committee was correct in imposing the Public 
Reprimand. 
II. MR. NEMELKA WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS 
Mr. Nemelka claims that he was not afforded reasonable due process at 
the Exception Hearing because he was not allowed to introduce the testimony of 
a witness who had not testified at the Screening Panel hearing. He also 
complains that he was not allowed to cross-examine the complainant at the 
Exception Hearing and that this made the hearing unfair. Rule 14-510(c) details 
the requirements for a fair exception hearing as follows: 
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten 
days after notice of the recommendation of an admonition or public 
reprimand to the Committee chair, the respondent may file with the 
Committee chair an exception to the recommendation and may 
also, if desired, request a hearing. If a request for a hearing is 
made, the Committee chair, or a screening panel chair designated 
by the Committee chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an 
expeditious manner, with OPC counsel and the respondent having 
the opportunity to be present. The complainant's testimony may be 
read into the record. The complainant need not appear personally 
unless called by the respondent as an adverse witness for 
purposes of cross-examination. The respondent shall have the 
burden of proof of showing that the recommendation is 
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, 
capricious and otherwise clearly erroneous.37 
37
 Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010). 
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The rule allows for cross-examination of the Complainant but only if he or 
she has been called by the Respondent as an adverse witness for purposes of 
cross-examination. Rather than making a request to either the OPC or the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee Chair, Art Berger, that Ms. Pugh be present at the 
Exception Hearing as part of his Exception Hearing request, Mr. Nemelka 
appeared at the Exception Hearing and indicated that he wanted to cross-
examine Ms. Pugh. He further stated that he had attempted to subpoena her and 
was unsuccessful in his attempt.38 Mr. Nemelka's subpoena had not been issued 
by any court and his request to cross-examine Ms. Pugh was untimely. 
In actuality, Rule 14-503 addresses the appropriate procedure for issuing 
a subpoena in an attorney discipline matter prior to a formal complaint being filed 
in district court. Rule 14-503 states: "[a]ny party or a screening panel, for good 
cause shown, may petition under seal the district court for issuance of a 
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum or any order allowing discovery prior to the 
filing of a formal complaint. Except for good cause shown, all petitions under this 
rule shall require a five-day written notice to the opposing party prior to the 
issuance of an appropriate order of subpoena."39 
Mr. Nemelka filed his Exception on July 23, 2007. He was notified of the 
date of the hearing on April 9, 2008. Still he did not let the OPC know that he 
wished to cross-examine the Complainant prior to the hearing and did not 
properly request a subpoena to be issued by the court in order for her to be there 
at the hearing. Mr. Maak addressed the issue at the hearing and found that Mr. 
38
 See Appellant's Brief at 5 and Appellant's Addendum "B". 
39
 Appellee's Addendum (000011-000013). 
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Nemelka had not timely made his request known and therefore the hearing would 
go forward without the Complainant. It should be noted that Ms. Pugh was 
present at the Screening Panel hearing and Mr. Nemelka had the opportunity to 
pose questions to the Panel which could be directed to Ms. Pugh although cross-
examination is not allowed.40 This Court addressed cross-examination in the 
Harding case and found that "[djirect and cross-examination of the witnesses is 
not required in the quasi-administrative setting of the screening panel. As a 
result, we find no due process deficiencies in Harding's case."41 As such, it 
appears that the lack of cross-examination in this case did not violate Mr. 
Nemelka's due process rights, 
Mr. Nemelka also claims that his due process rights were denied when his 
witness was not allowed to testify at the Exception Hearing. Since the Exception 
Hearing is for review of the Screening Panel record, new evidence is not 
pertinent. Mr. Maak denied the request on the ground that "such testimony 
should have been given at the Screening Panel hearing."42 Rule 14-510(b)(2) 
affords "the respondent an opportunity to appear before the screening panel and 
testify under oath, together with any witnesses called by the respondent. . ,."43 
Due process requires that Mr. Nemelka be afforded a fair hearing. The 
Rules Governing the Utah State Bar set forth the requirements for fair hearings in 
Generally, the Screening Panel's determination would not be such that cross-examination 
would change the facts. The Respondent and Complainant's documents have been submitted, 
the Screening panel asks questions of each to clarify if necessary and then makes a 
determination. 
41
 Appellee's Addendum (000065-000070). In re Harding, 104 P.3d 1220 1225 (Utah 2004). 
42
 Appellant's Addendum "E" at 3. 
43
 Appellee's Addendum (000007-000010). 
17 
attorney discipline cases. Unless the Screening Panel or Exception Officer 
strayed far outside the Rules, the hearings are presumed to be fair. 
While it is somewhat unclear what other deprivations Mr. Nemelka is 
alleging he argues that his rights were violated in the two instances cited above. 
Mr. Maak addressed both of these issues prior to the Exception Hearing. His 
rulings on these issues were within the guidelines of the rules and were not 
unreasonable. Clearly, Mr. Nemelka had an opportunity to bring his witness to 
the Screening Panel Hearing which would have been appropriate under the 
rules. Furthermore, Mr. Nemelka had an opportunity under the rules to request 
that the Complainant be present at the Exception Hearing and to have an 
appropriate Subpoena issued in case she did not want to attend. Mr. Maak's 
decisions in this regard were within the rules and very reasonable in light of the 
timing of Mr. Nemelka's requests. Therefore, the Court should hold that Mr, 
Nemelka's due process rights were not violated. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nemelka has failed to show that the findings of fact giving rise to the 
imposition of a Public Reprimand are clearly erroneous. He has also failed to 
marshal the facts on both sides to allow this Court to draw any different 
inferences. Under the standards, the imposition of a Public Reprimand in this 
case was correct. Mr. Nemelka's argument that he was not afforded due process 
also fails because the Ethics and Discipline Committee process was fair and 
decisions made by Mr. Maak were reasonable given Mr. Nemelka's untimely 
18 
requests. Therefore, the Court should uphold the imposition of a Public 
Reprimand in this case. 
AA DATED this T ? f — day of October, 2008. 
UTAH-STATE BA 
Barbara L. Townsend 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
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In the Matter of the Discipline of Paul R. Ince, Bar No. 04345. 
No. 960298 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
957 P.2d 1233; 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53; 1998 Utah LEXIS 17 
April 10,1998, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Third District, Salt Lake 
Div. I. The Honorable William A. Thome. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant state bar 
sought review of a decision of the Third District, Salt 
Lake Division (Utah), which rejected the bar's request for 
disbarment of appellee attorney. 
OVERVIEW: A state bar appealed from the lower 
court's denial of its request to disbar an attorney who 
committed major acts of misconduct, including misap-
propriation of client and law firm funds, forgery, and 
failure to disclose his misconduct to a subsequent em-
ployer. The lower court held that mitigating favors 
weighed in favor of suspension rather than disbarment. 
On appeal, the court noted that its constitutional respon-
sibility under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4 required it to 
make an independent determination of the correctness of 
the discipline imposed by the lower court. The court 
found that the attorney committed serious criminal of-
fenses, that he did not report them until after his conduct 
had been discovered, and that any remorse he showed 
seemed to be motivated more from having been caught 
than from regret due to the acts he committed. The court 
took notice that the attorney committed multiple major 
acts of misconduct, and that he was motivated by dis-
honesty. The court found that such factors far outbal-
anced any mitigating circumstances in this case. 
OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision of the 
lower court and ruled that the attorney must be disbarred. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Pensions & Benefits Law > Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) > Prohibited Transactions 
> General Overview 
[HN1] Under 29 U.S.CS. §§ 1106-1108, employees may 
not use pension funds to make payment for a personal 
residence. 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings > 
Appeals 
[HN2] Under Utah Const, art VIII, § 4, the court plays a 
special role in governing the practice of law. This role 
includes overseeing the discipline of persons admitted to 
practice law. Thus, while the court reviews the trial 
court's findings of facts under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard, it reserves the right to draw different inferences 
from the facts than those drawn by the trial court. With 
respect to the discipline actually imposed, the court's 
constitutional responsibility requires it to make an inde-
pendent determination as to correctness. 
Environmental Law > Litigation & Administrative Pro-
ceedings > Toxic Torts 
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > General Over-
view 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN3] Disbarment is generally appropriate when a law-
yer (a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct 
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to de-
ceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious 
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injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a 
legal proceeding; (b) engages in serious criminal con-
duct, a necessary element of which includes intentional 
interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappro-
priation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation 
of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of an-
other; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of an-
other to commit any of these offenses; or (c) engages in 
any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously ad-
versely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Fraud > False Pretenses > Elements 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Property Crimes > Larceny & Theft > General Over-
view 
[HN4] Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405, a person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN5] In the absence of truly compelling mitigating cir-
cumstances, the intentional misappropriation of client 
funds is an act that merits disbarment. 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN6] After an attorney's misconduct is discovered, res-
titution can be characterized simply as the honesty of 
compulsion and may be evidence only of the lawyer's 
ability to raise the money or desire to avoid being dis-
barred rather than of a sincere desire to rectify the 
wrongdoing. On the other hand, an attorney who reports 
his own misconduct prior to discovery and attempts to 
make restitution even if he lacks the means to do so 
completely should have those efforts accorded greater 
weight in the determination of the sanction to be im-
posed. 
COUNSEL: Stephen R. Cochell, Kate A. Toomey, Salt 
Lake City, for Utah State Bar. 
Paul R. Ince, Park City, for himself. 
JUDGES: ZIMMERMAN, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, 
Justice Durham, and Justice Russon concur in Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion. Justice Stewart concurs in the 
result. 
OPINION BY: ZIMMERMAN 
OPINION 
[*1234] ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
The Utah State Bar ("the Bar") appeals from a dis-
trict court order rejecting the Bar's request for the dis-
barment of Paul R. Ince. In its findings of fact, the dis-
trict court determined that Ince had committed not less 
than nineteen major acts of misconduct over a fifteen-
month period, including misappropriating law firm and 
client fimds for his own use and benefit, forging docu-
ments to conceal an illegal transfer of pension funds, and 
failing to disclose his misconduct to a subsequent em-
ployer. Despite finding that the generally appropriate 
level of discipline fixed by the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions was disbarment, the court concluded 
that mitigating factors weighed in favor of suspension. 
The court [**2] then suspended Ince for fifteen months, 
to be followed by twenty-four months of supervised pro-
bation. The Bar appeals, arguing that Ince should be dis-
barred. We agree and therefore reverse. 
Before turning to the standard of review and analy-
sis, we must engage in a fairly extensive discussion of 
the facts leading up to the disbarment proceeding. From 
1984 through March of 1994, when his conduct was dis-
covered, Ince was employed by the law firm of Callister, 
Duncan & Nebeker ("CD&N"). During several years of 
his employment, Ince's family suffered numerous health 
and financial problems. In September of 1992, Ince and 
his wife happened upon a house for sale in Summit 
County. Because of a dream Ince's wife had, the Inces 
became fixated on purchasing that house. They listed 
their own home for sale the next week, but by February 
of 1993 it had not sold. The Inces had insufficient funds 
to make the down payment on the Summit County house 
but became convinced that purchasing it would alleviate 
some of the difficulties they were suffering. At that time, 
Ince decided to use $ 20,000 from his pension plan to-
ward the down payment. 
[HN1] Under ERISA and other applicable statutes, 
employees may not use [**3] pension funds to make 
payment for a personal residence. See generally 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1106-08. However, Ince represented to Zions 
Bank, the pension fund trustee, that he intended to use 
the money solely for investment purposes to purchase a 
lot adjacent to the Summit County home. This would 
have constituted a permissible investment under the pen-
sion plan's self-directed investment option. To convince 
CD&N and Zions Bank that he had in fact purchased the 
ii\i\(\(\9s 
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adjacent lot, Ince produced a forged warranty deed and 
two forged quitclaim deeds. 
After purchasing the home, the Inces continued to 
suffer financial difficulties. In an attempt to meet his 
financial obligations, Ince engaged in a series of actions 
designed to facilitate the misappropriation of money 
from CD&N, including the following: Ince collected 
payments totaling $ 1500 from firm clients but kept the 
money for himself. He obtained checks from CD&N's 
accounting department to cover fabricated fees or ex-
penses and converted those funds to his personal use. For 
instance, Ince obtained a check for approximately $ 2600 
drawn on CD&N's trust account by telling the firm that 
[*1235] the money was for a settlement closing and that 
funds from [**4] the closing would be returned to the 
trust account to cover the disbursement. He then forged 
the endorsement on the check, used the money for his 
mortgage payment, and failed to return the funds to the 
trust account. 
Ince also manipulated an account denominated the 
"MSI Resolution Trust." Ince had established this ac-
count for the purpose of managing a client's funds for 
settlements with various creditors, including CD&N. 
Ince accepted two $ 5000 payments from the client--in 
July and December of 1993. He deposited roughly half 
of the July payment with CD&N as payment for services 
rendered and kept the remainder, and he kept all of the 
December payment, maintaining that it was a personal 
gift to him from the client. 
In another incident involving the MSI account, 
Ince's brother, an attorney in Wyoming who was himself 
having financial and professional difficulties, convinced 
Ince to provide him with a check payable to his firm for 
$ 15,000. The check was drawn on the MSI account even 
though there was no connection between the client for 
whom the MSI account had been established and Ince's 
brother's firm. The check was presented for payment 
earlier than Ince anticipated and was dishonored [**5] 
due to insufficient funds. Ince's brother then persuaded 
Ince to write a letter to his Wyoming firm on CD&N 
letterhead providing a falsified explanation of why the 
first check had failed to clear. 
In March of 1994, CD&N discovered Ince's misuse 
of the pension fund and the related forgeries. Ince of-
fered to resign, and CD&N accepted this offer. After 
Ince's resignation, CD&N discovered additional miscon-
duct. When confronted, Ince admitted the acts which had 
been discovered, but he did not volunteer information 
regarding his still undiscovered misdeeds. Eventually, 
Ince asked to speak to CD&N's management for the sup-
posed purpose of making a full disclosure and arranging 
to repay all amounts he had misappropriated. Even then, 
however, he failed to reveal his misconduct regarding the 
two $ 5000 payments to the MSI account that were in-
tended for payment of fees due to Ince's firm. ' CD&N 
discovered these transactions in subsequent weeks, and 
when confronted, Ince agreed to make restitution. Ince 
sold the house in Summit County and other property to 
raise the necessary funds. All money owed to CD&N 
was repaid within a few months of Ince's resignation. 
1 Although Ince maintained that the second 
payment was intended as a gift to him, the trial 
court specifically found that the payments were 
intended for CD&N. 
[**6] In May of 1994, after his misconduct had 
been discovered by CD&N, Ince contacted the Bar and 
met with the chief disciplinary counsel, to whom he dis-
closed the general nature of his misconduct. CD&N filed 
a complaint against Ince with the Bar a few weeks later. 
After his resignation in March, Ince began looking for a 
new job. In May of 1994, Ince interviewed for and 
eventually obtained a position in the Child Protection 
Division of the Utah Attorney General's office. While 
Ince implied during his interview that his departure from 
CD&N had occurred under disagreeable circumstances, 
he did not fully disclose the situation or give any indica-
tion that it had come about as a result of his own mis-
conduct. The Attorney General's office hired Ince with-
out contacting anyone at CD&N. A year and a half later, 
the Attorney General's office learned of Ince's miscon-
duct and fired him. 
The Bar filed a formal complaint against Ince in 
June of 1995. The district court conducted a trial in April 
of 1996. The court found that although disbarment was 
the "generally appropriate1' sanction for Ince's miscon-
duct, "mitigating circumstances outweighed the miscon-
duct" Therefore, the court ordered Ince [**7] suspended 
for fifteen months, to be followed by twenty-four months 
of probation during which time Ince would have to dis-
close his misconduct prior to handling any client funds 
and would have to perform thirty hours of community 
service per month. 
On appeal, the Bar argues that the district court gave 
undue weight to mitigating evidence and that Ince should 
be disbarred. The Bar also requests that we adopt a rule 
[*1236] that absent extremely compelling circum-
stances, an attorney who intentionally misappropriates 
funds, whether from his client or from his law firm, 
should be disbarred. Ince declined to file a brief in oppo-
sition to the Bar's appeal but did appear at oral argument. 
We begin our analysis by determining the correct 
standard of review. In 1993, this court adopted the Utah 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline"). The Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
effected a major change in the procedure followed in 
'CKiQQS-
Page 4 
957 P.2d 1233, *; 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53; 
1998 Utah LEXIS 17,** 
attorney discipline cases by transferring jurisdiction over 
formal Bar complaints from the Board of Bar Commis-
sioners to the district courts. See In re Discipline of 
Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1997). Under the re-
vised procedure, the district court [**8] conducts a trial 
and enters an order of discipline that is a final order un-
less appealed. Id. at 213. In our recent opinion In re 
Discipline of Babilis, we set forth a general outline of the 
revised procedures and addressed the application of the 
standard of review to these revised disciplinary proce-
dures. We briefly reiterate that standard here. 
[HN2] Under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Con-
stitution, this court plays a special role in governing the 
practice of law. This role includes overseeing the disci-
pline of persons admitted to practice law. See id. at 213. 
Thus, while we review the trial court's findings of facts 
under the clearly erroneous standard, see State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994), we reserve the right 
to draw different inferences from the facts than those 
drawn by the trial court. See Babilis, 951 P.2d at 21L 
With respect to the discipline actually imposed, our con-
stitutional responsibility requires us to make an inde-
pendent determination as to its correctness. See id. 
Moving to our analysis, the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions ("the Standards"), which were adopted 
at the same time as the Rules of Lawyer Discipline, 
[**9] provide six rules to guide courts in determining 
the proper sanction to impose on an attorney who vio-
lates the standards of ethical conduct. See id. at 211. The 
first three rules set forth the purpose of the Standards, a 
general overview of the scope of the available sanctions, 
and the factors to be considered in imposing sanctions. 
The remaining three rules govern the determination of 
the sanctions to be applied in a given case. Rule 4 estab-
lishes the "generally appropriate" or presumptive level of 
discipline that should be imposed. Rule 5 addresses cases 
in which a prior order of discipline has been entered, and 
rule 6 provides for the consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in the ultimate determination of 
what sanction should be imposed. See id. at 212-13. 
Rules 4 and 6 are the rules with which we are con-
cerned in this case. As stated earlier, the district court 
found that "absent aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, the appropriate discipline is disbarment." Rule 
4.2 sets forth the circumstances under which disbarment 
is generally appropriate. It states: 
Rule 4.2 Disbarment 
[HN3] Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer: 
(a) [**10] knowingly engages in professional mis-
conduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d). (e), or (f) of the 
Rules of Professional Conductp ] with the intent to bene-
fit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and 
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or poten-
tially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
2 The referenced portion of rule 8.4 states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of an-
other; 
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice; 
(e) State or imply an ability to influence im-
properly a government agency or official; 
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial offi-
cer in conduct that is a violation of applicable 
Rules of Judicial Conduct or other law[.] 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary 
[**11] element of which includes [*1237] intentional 
interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappro-
priation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation 
of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of an-
other; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of an-
other to commit any of these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Rule 4.2. As 
we noted in Babilis, there is no requirement that all three 
subdivisions of rule 4.2 be violated for disbarment to be 
the presumptively appropriate sanction. See 951 P.2d at 
215. A finding that any one of (a), (b), or (c) has been 
violated is sufficient. See id. 
In this case, Ince's conduct clearly falls within rule 
4.2. Most notably, rule 4.2(b) refers to "serious criminal 
conduct, a necessary element of which includes . . . false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappro-
priation, or theft." lnce committed numerous crimes in-
volving these elements. For example, [**12] he com-
mitted theft on several occasions by taking for his own 
use and benefit payments from clients that were sup-
posed to be transmitted to CD&N. See [HN4] Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 ("A person commits theft if he obtains 
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or exercises control over property of another by decep-
tion and with a purpose to deprive him thereof."). He 
also stole client funds when he billed Zions Bank for 
fabricated expert witness fees. 
In Babilis, we stated that [HN5] in the absence of 
truly compelling mitigating circumstances, the inten-
tional misappropriation of client funds is an act that mer-
its disbarment. 951 P.2d at 217. The Bar urges us to 
adopt the same posture toward intentional misappropria-
tion of law firm funds, and we do so today. The fact that 
the majority of the money Ince stole came from his law 
firm rather than from a client neither changes the essen-
tial nature of his conduct nor makes it any less serious. 
The conduct still falls within the confines of rule 4.2(b). 
In addition to committing theft, Ince also committed 
several acts of forgery-altering a trust deed, forging 
quitclaim and warranty deeds, and forging an endorse-
ment on a check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (de-
fining forgery). [**13] Ince's acts could have been 
prosecuted as felonies or misdemeanors and clearly con-
stitute serious criminal conduct for the purposes of rule 
4.2(b). Furthermore, several of Ince's acts, although not 
criminal in nature, satisfy the requirements of 4.2(c). In 
particular, Ince's conduct with regard to the $ 15,000 
check he wrote against the MSI account and the subse-
quent letter explaining why that check bounced were 
intentional acts involving dishonesty and deceit. These 
acts seriously adversely reflect on Ince's fitness to prac-
tice law, thereby making disbarment the presumptively 
appropriate sanction. 
Once a trial court determines the presumptive level 
of discipline, it may apply rule 6 and consider the aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances in deciding what 
sanction should ultimately be imposed. Because rule 6 
does not provide any guidance as to how these circum-
stances are to be weighed, the process of applying them 
is necessarily somewhat subjective. However, one of the 
concerns that prompted the adoption of the present Stan-
dards was that under the prior disciplinary regime, there 
was no detailed set of guidelines that defined the sanc-
tion generally appropriate for a given type of [**14] 
misconduct. Thus, discipline under the old regime had 
something of an ad hoc quality, and there was the possi-
bility, if not the probability, that similarly situated indi-
viduals might not receive similar sanctions. See Babilis, 
951 P.2d at 211-12; see id. at 218 (Zimmerman, J., con-
curring). Although the new Standards are intended to 
preserve a measure of flexibility in assigning sanctions, 
the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the un-
certainty that existed under the old rules. Therefore, we 
offer the following guidance as to the application of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances under rule 6. 
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of 
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and 
mitigating [*1238] factors must be significant. In this 
case, we find that the district court accorded too much 
weight to mitigating factors which were not particularly 
compelling. This is especially true given the number of 
aggravating factors that existed. Thus, the weight of the 
mitigating factors is at least balanced by the aggravating 
factors. Under such circumstances, no adjustment to the 
presumptively appropriate level of discipline is war-
ranted. 
To elaborate, the [**15] district court found that the 
following mitigating factors weighed in favor of suspen-
sion: Ince (1) had no previous record of discipline: (2) 
had personal or emotional problems during the relevant 
time frame; (3) made timely, good faith restitution of the 
money owed to his employer: (4) enjoyed a good reputa-
tion both before and after his misconduct; (5) exhibited 
remorse and interim reform and did not commit any fur-
ther misconduct; and (6) demonstrated good work in the 
Child Protection Division of the Attorney General's of-
fice following his resignation from CD&N. 
The court also found the following aggravating fac-
tors: (1) Ince's conduct demonstrated a dishonest motive 
(the misconduct was motivated by the desire to support a 
lifestyle he could not afford); (2) Ince engaged in a pat-
tern of misconduct; (3) Ince committed multiple of-
fenses—nineteen major acts of misconduct over a fifteen-
month period; and (4) the conduct was illegal. 
There are a number of general statements which can 
be made about the mitigating factors the court found to 
exist in this case and how much weight they should be 
accorded. First, Ince's restitution should not be given 
much weight because it was made only [**16] after his 
misconduct had been discovered and he had been con-
fronted by CD&N. [HN6] After an attorney's misconduct 
is discovered, restitution can be characterized simply as 
the "honesty of compulsion" and may be evidence only 
of the lawyer's ability to raise the money or desire to 
avoid being disbarred rather than of a sincere desire to 
rectify the wrongdoing. In re Wilson, 81 N.J, 451, 409 
A.2d 1153, 1156 (NJ. 1979), On the other hand, an at-
torney who reports his own misconduct prior to discov-
ery and attempts to make restitution even if he lacks the 
means to do so completely should have those efforts ac-
corded greater weight in the determination of the sanc-
tion to be imposed. 
The same reasoning applies to Ince's voluntary re-
porting of his misconduct to the Bar. This disclosure 
took place only after his misconduct had been discovered 
by CD&N. At that point, Ince could reasonably antici-
pate that CD&N would report him to the Bar. Therefore, 
his disclosure was self-serving. In contrast, an attorney 
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who reports his own misconduct to the Bar prior to dis-
covery, perhaps knowing that the misconduct might not 
ever be discovered, would certainly be entitled to have 
this voluntary disclosure [**17] weighed heavily as a 
mitigating factor. 
Furthermore, Ince's supposed interim remorse and 
reform are not compelling. For example, when first con-
fronted by CD&N with evidence of his misconduct, Ince 
was not forthcoming. He repeatedly admitted to acts of 
misconduct only when confronted with specific evidence 
and was never completely willing to admit to undiscov-
ered misconduct. 1 He then failed to disclose the true 
reason for his resignation from CD&N to the Attorney 
General. Rather than seeming truly sorry for his conduct 
and admitting to it, Ince seemed sorry only that he had 
been caught. 
3 Although Ince did eventually disclose several 
incidents of undiscovered misconduct to CD&N, 
he did so only after significant prodding and was 
never forthright with respect to his misconduct 
involving the MSI account. 
As for reform, Ince's position and reputed good 
work with the Attorney General's office are not entitled 
to significant weight. Because his position with the At-
torney General did not involve control over client [**18] 
or state funds, Ince has not demonstrated that he would 
not fall victim to the same temptations if he again en-
countered financial difficulties at home. The fact that 
witnesses testified that Ince did good work at the Attor-
ney General's office is similarly unconvincing as these 
character witnesses were not aware of the full extent of 
Ince's malfeasance. Without this knowledge, their opin-
ions expressing [*1239] disapproval of the Bar's efforts 
to revoke ince's license were not fully informed. 
In the final balance, we must consider all of the cir-
cumstances in light of the Standards for Imposing Law-
yer Sanctions. The primary purposes promoted by the 
Standards are to protect the public and the judicial sys-
tem and to uphold high standards of professionalism. The 
presumptive sanctions the Standards set forth for various 
types of misconduct are carefulJy calculated to further 
those purposes. None of these purposes would be well-
served were we to uphold the decision of the district 
court and allow an attorney who knowingly violated the 
rules of professional conduct and stole money to support 
a lifestyle beyond his means to continue practicing in the 
absence of a significant imbalance of mitigating [**19] 
and aggravating circumstances. Therefore, Ince must be 
disbarred. 
Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Justice 
Russon concur in Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
Justice Stewart concurs in the result. 
. n ^ n n Q 
Rule 14-510. Prosecution and appeals. 
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct 
(a)(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member of 
the Bar by any person, OPC counsel or the Committee, by filing with the Bar, in 
writing, an informal complaint in ordinary, plain and concise language setting 
forth the acts or omissions claimed to constitute unprofessional conduct. Upon 
filing, an informal complaint shall be processed in accordance with this article. 
(a)(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be in any 
particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal writing, although a 
form may be provided by the OPC to standardize the informal complaint format. It 
is unnecessary that the informal complaint recite disciplinary rules, ethical 
canons or a prayer requesting specific disciplinary action. The informal complaint 
shall be signed by the complainant and shall set forth the complainant's address, 
and may list the names and addresses of other witnesses. The informal 
complaint shall be notarized and contain a verification attesting to the accuracy of 
the information contained in the complaint. In accordance with Rule 14-504(b), 
complaints filed by OPC are not required to contain a verification. The substance 
of the informal complaint shall prevail over the form. 
(a)(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint, OPC counsel 
shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the informal 
complaint is sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not, OPC counsel shall 
seek additional facts from the complainant; additional facts shall also be 
submitted in writing and signed by the complainant. 
(a)(4) Notice of informal complaint. Upon completion of the preliminary 
investigation, OPC counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can 
be resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and the complainant's 
interest. OPC counsel and/or the screening panel may use their efforts to resolve 
the informal complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be so resolved or if it sets 
forth facts which, by their very nature, should be brought before the screening 
panel, or if good cause otherwise exists to bring the matter before the screening 
panel, OPC counsel shall cause to be served a NOIC by regular mail upon the 
respondent at the address reflected in the records of the Bar. The NOIC shall 
have attached a true copy of the signed informal complaint against the 
respondent and shall identify with particularity the possible violation(s) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct raised by the informal complaint as preliminarily 
determined by OPC counsel. 
(a)(5) Answer to informal complaint. Within 20 days after service of the NOIC on 
the respondent, the respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and signed 
answer setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal 
complaint, together with all defenses and responses to the claims of possible 
misconduct. For good cause shown, OPC counsel may extend the time for the 
filing of an answer by the respondent not to exceed an additional 30 days. Upon 
the answer having been filed or if the respondent fails to respond, OPC counsel 
shall refer the case to a screening panel for investigation, consideration and 
determination. OPC counsel shall forward a copy of the answer to the 
complainant. 
(a)(6) Dismissal of informal complaint. An informal complaint which, upon 
consideration of all factors, is determined by OPC counsel to be frivolous, 
unintelligible, barred by the statute of limitations, more adequately addressed in 
another forum, unsupported by fact or which does not raise probable cause of 
any unprofessional conduct, or which OPC declines to prosecute may be 
dismissed by OPC counsel without hearing by a screening panel. OPC counsel 
shall notify the complainant of such dismissal stating the reasons therefor. The 
complainant may appeal a dismissal by OPC counsel to the Committee chair 
within 15 days after notification of the dismissal is mailed. Upon appeal, the 
Committee chair shall conduct a de novo review of the file, either affirm the 
dismissal or require OPC counsel to prepare a NOIC, and set the matter for 
hearing by a screening panel. In the event of the chair's recusal, the chair shall 
appoint the vice chair or one of the screening panel chairs to review and 
determine the appeal. 
(b) Proceedings before Committee and screening panels. 
(b)(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal 
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts developed by the 
informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, and the recommendations 
of OPC counsel. 
(b)(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may result in 
the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal complaint, the 
screening panel shall, upon at least 14 days notice, afford the respondent an 
opportunity to appear before the screening panel and testify under oath, together 
with any witnesses called by the respondent, and to present an oral argument 
with respect to the informal complaint. All testimony shall be recorded and 
preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and in any event, not less than 
six months following the hearing. A written brief may also be submitted to the 
screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall not exceed five pages in 
length unless permission for enlargement is extended by the chair or the chair's 
delegate for good cause shown. A copy of the brief shall be forwarded by OPC 
counsel to the complainant. 
(b)(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to appear 
before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, together with any 
witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to the informal complaint or in 
opposition to the matters presented by the respondent. The complainant may be 
represented by counsel or some other representative. 
(b)(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall each 
have the right to be present during the presentation of the evidence unless 
excluded by the screening panel chair for good cause shown. 
(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts developed by 
the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the screening panel, in 
behalf of the Committee, shall make one of the following determinations: 
(b)(5)(A) that the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is 
probable cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, in which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel 
shall promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant 
and the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(B) that a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed by OPC 
counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the future 
conduct of the respondent. Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be 
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the 
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the caution; or 
(b)(5)(C) that a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by the 
respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be 
warranted by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct; or 
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an 
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be 
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall 
state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the 
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such screening 
panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of 
the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an 
order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days 
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an 
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent receive a 
public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and 
shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and 
the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public reprimand. A copy of 
such screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior 
to the delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee 
chair shall enter an order publicly reprimanding the respondent if no exception 
has been filed within ten days of notice of the recommendation being provided to 
the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(F) that a formal complaint be filed against the respondent 
(b)(6) Determination of appropriate sanction. In determining an appropriate 
sanction and only after having found unethical conduct, the screening panel may 
consider any admonitions or greater discipline imposed upon the respondent 
within the five years immediately preceding the alleged offense. 
(b)(7) Continuance of disciplinary proceedings. A disciplinary proceeding may be 
held in abeyance by the Committee prior to the filing of a formal complaint when 
the allegations or the informal complaint contain matters of substantial similarity 
to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation in which the 
respondent is involved. 
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten days after notice 
of the recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand to the Committee 
chair, the respondent may file with the Committee chair an exception to the 
recommendation and may also, if desired, request a hearing. If a request for a 
hearing is made, the Committee chair, or a screening panel chair designated by 
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the Committee chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an expeditious manner, 
with OPC counsel and the respondent having the opportunity to be present. The 
complainant's testimony may be read into the record. The complainant need not 
appear personally unless called by the respondent as an adverse witness for 
purposes of cross-examination. The respondent shall have the burden of proof of 
showing that the recommendation is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial 
evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly erroneous. 
'U'-GIO 
Rule 14-503. Ethics and Discipline Committee. 
(a) Composition. The Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. The 
Committee shall consist of eight public members and 26 members of the Bar who 
have demonstrated a high standard of professional conduct All appointments 
shall be for a term of three years. The Supreme Court shall designate one lawyer 
member as Committee chair and one lawyer member as Committee vice chair. 
Committee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms. 
(b) Committee chair. The Committee chair shall supervise the Committee and 
screening panels. The chair is responsible to maintain an adequate check on the 
work of the screening panels to ensure that matters move forward expeditiously, 
to determine that screening panels have a uniform basis for the judgments 
rendered, and to provide the screening panels with information concerning ethics 
and judicial decisions necessary to their activities. The chair shall make 
recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning appointments to the 
screening panels and reports concerning the activities of the screening panels 
and the overall work of the Committee. 
(c) Vice chair. The Committee vice chair shall act in the event of the chair's 
absence or resignation. The chair may call upon the vice chair to assist in any of 
the Committee chair's duties. 
(d) Screening panels, quorums. The Committee members, except forrthe 
Committee chair and Committee vice chair, shall be divided into four screening 
panel sections of six members of the Bar and two public members. The Supreme 
Court shall name a screening panel chair from each screening panel, who shall 
preside over the screening panel. In the absence of the screening panel chair, a 
screening panel vice chair designated by the screening panel shall preside. Two 
members of the Bar plus one public member shall constitute a quorum of a 
screening panel. The concurrence of a majority of those members present and 
voting at any proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination. If 
an even number of screening panel members participate in a proceeding, the 
chair or vice chair shall not vote unless necessary to break a tie. The chair or 
vice chair shall, however, fully participate in the proceeding. Each screening 
panel shall meet as is necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its duties. 
The entire Committee may be convened at such other times by the chair as 
necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its duties. 
(e) Resignations, alternates. If a Committee member does not attend three 
consecutive scheduled screening panel hearings, that Committee member shall 
automatically be deemed to have resigned his or her Committee appointment. 
Members of any screening panel may serve as alternate members on different 
screening panels. The Committee chair and the Committee vice chair may serve 
as alternate members on all screening panels. 
(f) Responsibilities. Informal complaints shall be randomly assigned to screening 
panels. The screening panels shall review, investigate, and hear all informal 
complaints charging unethical and/or unprofessional conduct against members of 
the Bar. After such review, investigation, hearing and analysis, the screening 
panels shall determine the action to be taken on any informal complaint which, 
based upon the facts of the particular case, is most consistent with the public 
interest and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(g) Subpoena. Any party or a screening panel, for good cause shown, may 
petition under seal the district court for issuance of a subpoena, subpoena duces 
tecum or any order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal complaint. 
Except for good cause shown, all petitions under this rule shall require a five-day 
written notice to the opposing party prior to the issuance of an appropriate order 
of subpoena. 
(g)(1) Enforcement of subpoena. A district court in the district in which the 
attendance or production is required may, upon proper application, enforce the 
attendance and testimony of any witnesses and the production of any documents 
subpoenaed. 
(g)(2) Quashing subpoena. Any attack on the validity of a subpoena so issued 
shall be heard and determined by the Committee chair or by the court wherein 
enforcement of the subpoena is being sought. Any resulting order is not 
appealable prior to the entry of a final order in the proceeding. 
(g)(3) Witnesses and fees. Subpoena fees, witness fees, and mileage shall be 
reimbursed in the amounts provided under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(h)(1) Committee and OPC as screening panel secretary. OPC counsel shaH be 
the secretary to the Committee and is charged with the responsibility of the 
administrative affairs of the Committee, the handling of the screening panel 
calendars, giving notice to screening panel members and members of the Bar 
whose attendance is requested, notifying those who have filed informal 
complaints of the times and dates their matters will be heard, and otherwise 
performing or providing the secretarial and administrative functions of the 
Committee and screening panels. Except as otherwise provided in this article, 
whenever OPC counsel may be present before a screening panel during a 
hearing, the respondent may also be present. 
(h)(2) OPC counsel shall within three months after the filing of an informal 
complaint of unprofessional or unethical conduct of a respondent, advise the 
party making the informal complaint concerning the initial consideration of the 
informal complaint, and shall promptly advise such party in writing of the 
subsequent disposition of the informal complaint and the reasons therefor, 
(i) Annual report. Senior counsel shall prepare and submit an annual report to the 
Supreme Court and the Board encompassing the scope and nature of the 
Committee work. The report shall be submitted on or about August 1 of each 
year for the preceding fiscal year and shall set forth the number of disciplinary 
cases investigated, the number brought before the Committee, formal complaints 
filed, dispositions, cases dismissed, informal ethics opinions issued, diversionary 
dispositions and such other information as may be helpful to the Supreme Court 
in comprehending the operations of the OPC as well as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the disciplinary system. Such report may contain Committee 
recommendations for rule amendments or changes in Committee procedure. The 
chair and senior counsel shall annually consult with the Board and the Supreme 
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Court regarding the level of activity and general standing of disciplinary matters 
and procedures. 
ifUflGIS 
Page 1 
LEXSEE48P.3D881 
O 
Analysis 
As of: Oct 01, 2008 
In the Matter of the Discipline of Jamis M. Johnson, No. 3937. 
No. 990806 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
2001 UT110; 48 PJd 881; 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 17; 2001 Utah LEXIS 195 
December 18, 2001, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Rehearing denied by, 
04/25/2002 
Related proceeding at Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 
394, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 424 (2006) 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*** 1 ] Third District, Salt Lake 
County. The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. 
DISPOSITION: Judgment of disbarment is affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, disbarred an attorney from the 
practice of law for intentionally misappropriating client 
funds, a violation of the Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.15. The 
district court stayed the judgment pending appeal. The 
Utah State Bar, through its Office of Professional Con-
duct (OPC), appealed from the order staying the judg-
ment. The attorney cross-appealed from the judgment of 
disbarment. 
OVERVIEW: The attorney issued a check to a client in 
settlement of an action. The client returned the check and 
filed a complaint with the OPC. The complaint was dis-
missed, and the client requested the return of the settle-
ment funds. The client filed another complaint with the 
OPC. The attorney did not dispute the fact that he did not 
return the $ 28,800 to his client, but used it for his own 
personal purposes. The trial court found that he made no 
satisfactory explanation for this failure. The Utah Su-
preme Court found that: (1) the attorney tendered $ 
28,800 as the client's portion of the settlement funds; (2) 
pending resolution of the dispute with his client over 
ownership of those funds, he was required to maintain 
them in a separate trust account; (3) neither of the factors 
the attorney presented as mitigating the presumptive 
sanction of disbarment was truly compelling; but (4) the 
attorney was entitled to a stay of judgment pending ap-
peal so long as the likelihood of harm to the public dur-
ing the pendency of appeal was slim. 
OUTCOME: The judgment of disbarment was affirmed. 
The trial court did not err in granting the attorney's mo-
tion for a stay pending appeal. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > Jurisdiction Over Actions > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Clearly Erroneous Review 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings > 
Appeals 
[HN1] The Utah Supreme Court is charged with gov-
erning the conduct and discipline of those admitted to 
practice law in Utah. Thus in reviewing attorney disci-
pline cases, while the Utah Supreme Court reviews the 
trial court's finding of facts under the clearly erroneous 
standard, it reserves the right to draw different inferences 
from the facts than those drawn by the trial court. In ad-
dition, the Utah Supreme Court's constitutional responsi-
bility requires it to make an independent determination 
as to the correctness of the discipline actually imposed. 
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Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Misconduct & Unethical 
Behavior > General Overview 
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > General Over-
view 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > General Overview 
[HN2] Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 3 provides 
that after misconduct has been found, the factors to be 
considered in imposing a sanction include: (a) the duty 
violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or 
actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) 
the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Misconduct <£ Unethical 
Behavior > General Overview 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN3] Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 4.2 addi-
tionally provides that an order disbarring an attorney is 
generally appropriate absent mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances when he or she: (a) knowingly engages in 
professional misconduct as defined in Utah Stand. Im-
posing Law. Sanctions 8.4(a), (d), (e), (f) with the intent 
to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, 
the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or po-
tentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary ele-
ment of which includes intentional interference with the 
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, extortion, misappropriation or an attempt or 
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of 
these offenses; or (c) engages in any other intentional 
misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation that seriously adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN4] Intentional misappropriation of a client's funds 
will result in disbarment absent truly compelling miti-
gating circumstances. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties 
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Client Funds 
[HN5] Intentional misappropriation of a client's funds is 
always indefensible; it strikes at the very foundation of 
the trust and honesty that are indispensable to the func-
tioning of the attorney-client relationship and, indeed, to 
the functioning of the legal profession itself. The Utah 
Supreme Court will not abide such conduct. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > 
Property Crimes > Embezzlement > Penalties 
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Client Funds 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > General Overview 
[HN6] Although a good reputation and community serv-
ice are commendable, they do not constitute truly com-
pelling mitigating circumstances when there is a misap-
propriation of client's funds. 
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Client Funds 
[HN7] The rules of professional conduct require that in 
the case of a dispute over funds, the attorney is to main-
tain those funds in a separate trust account until the dis-
pute is resolved. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(c). 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN8] Once an attorney's conduct is found to fall within 
Utah Stand. Imposing Law. Sanctions 4.2, the presump-
tive sanction is disbarment. There is no additional burden 
to show aggravating circumstances; the absence of ag-
gravating factors is not a mitigating factor. 
Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Mootness > Evading 
Review Exception 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > General 
Overview 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disbarments 
[HN9] The appellate court generally refrains from de-
ciding moot questions because of its policy against issu-
ing advisory opinions. However, some cases warrant an 
exception to this policy because the issue is one of wide 
public concern, and because of the short period any one 
litigant is affected by it, the issue is capable of repetition 
yet evading review. 
Civil Procedure > Counsel > General Overview 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings > 
Appeals 
[HN10] Utah R. Law. Disc. & Disability 17 provides that 
unless otherwise noted, the Utah R. Civ. P., and the Utah 
R. App. P. governing civil appeals apply in formal disci-
pline actions. Utah R. Civ. P. 17. 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments > 
Stays of Proceedings > General Overview 
[HNll] Utah R. App. P. 8 provides that a stay of a 
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal must 
generally be sought in the district court. Utah R. Civ. P. 
8. 
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Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments > 
Stays of Proceedings > General Overview 
[HN12] Utah R. Civ. P. 62 provides that a trial court can 
grant a motion for stay pending appeal in its discretion 
and on such conditions for the security of the adverse 
party as are proper. Utah R. Civ. P. 62(a). 
Criminal Law <£ Procedure > Sentencing > Stays 
Criminal Law <£ Procedure > Postconviction Proceed-
ings > Stays of Judgments 
Legal Ethics > General Overview 
[HN13] Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's constitu-
tional charge to govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline 
of persons admitted to practice law, Utah Const, art. 
VIII, § 4. it enunciates a standard to guide the discretion 
of the district court in determining whether to stay a 
judgment of sanction pending appeal of that judgment to 
the Utah Supreme Court. When an attorney can meet the 
burden of demonstrating to the trial court's satisfaction 
that his or her continued practice of law pending appeal 
does not pose a substantial threat of irreparable harm to 
the public, the trial court may, in its discretion, grant the 
stay. Under this standard, cases where the attorney's mis-
conduct is a one-time incident as opposed to a pattern of 
misconduct over a period of time will probably be the 
most likely instances where a stay will be appropriate. 
The Utah Supreme Court does not require, however, that 
the attorney also demonstrate that he or she has issues 
which are likely to result in reversal on appeal as it does 
in criminal cases where a convicted criminal defendant 
seeks a stay pending appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(d)(2). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Stays 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceed-
ings > Stays of Judgments 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings > 
Appeals 
[HN14] The discipline of an attorney is a civil case and 
the ultimate power to discipline is vested in the Utah 
Supreme Court under the Utah Constitution. The district 
courts in hearing the discipline cases act only as the Utah 
Supreme Court's agent. Because the private practice of 
law cannot easily be stopped and started again, unless 
there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the 
public, a disbarred lawyer should be entitled to a stay of 
judgment pending appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
where the final authority for discipline rests. 
COUNSEL: Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Cameron S. Den-
ning, Salt Lake City, for Johnson. 
Kate A. Toomey, Salt Lake City, for the Utah State Bar. 
JUDGES: HOWE, Chief Justice. Associate Chief Jus-
tice Russon and Justice Durrant concur in Chief Justice 
Howe's opinion. DURHAM, Justice, concurring and dis-
senting. WILKINS, Justice, concurring and dissenting. 
OPINION BY: HOWE 
OPINION 
[**882] HOWE, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] Attorney Jamis Johnson was disbarred from 
the practice of law for intentionally misappropriating 
client funds, a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. The trial court stayed the judgment pending 
any appeal. The Utah State Bar, through its Office of 
Professional Conduct (OPC), appeals from the order 
staying the judgment. Johnson cross-appeals from the 
judgment of disbarment. 
[**883] BACKGROUND 
[*P2] In connection with his representation of a 
client, Johnson settled a case for $ 50,000. He deposited 
that money in a trust account as required by rule 1.15 of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and [***2] ten-
dered a check in the amount of $ 28,800 to his client as 
its share of the settlement. Upon receiving the check, the 
client told Johnson it was going to return it to him be-
cause he did not have authority to settle for $ 50,000 
without the client's consent. In a letter to his client dated 
January 19, 1993, Johnson responded: 
In our last conversation, you claimed to 
have returned the trust account check I 
sent you. I have not received that check. I 
have therefore stopped payment on that 
check. 
If you want me to issue another check 
I will, but I will await your instructions in 
that regard. 
In the meantime, I will hold the funds 
in trust. If I am compelled to take any 
further action on the matter, you will be 
billed at the previously discussed rate of $ 
150.00 and I will, as the bill accrues, draw 
down such legal fees out of the amount of 
the trust account. 
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(Emphasis added.) In a letter dated January 26, 1993, 
Johnson's client responded: 
I inadvertently failed to return the Trust 
Account check. Please find it enclosed 
herewith. 
In response to your January 19, 1993 
letter you may do as you wish with the 
funds, but you should be aware that 
[***3] you have not responded to our last 
conversation in which I suggested that we 
pursue arbitration or mediation. I am, 
therefore, proceeding formally against 
you under the laws of the State of Utah... 
. . . Do not work on this matter or any 
other matter related to [this client] or any 
of its subsidiaries. 
(Emphasis added.) The client then filed an informal 
complaint with the OPC alleging that Johnson had settled 
the case without authority; the complaint was later dis-
missed. Approximately fifteen months later, the client 
demanded payment of the $ 28,800 by letter dated April 
15, 1994. When Johnson had not returned the funds by 
February 16, 1995, the client again sent a letter demand-
ing payment within ten days. When the client did not 
receive payment, it made a second informal complaint to 
the OPC, alleging misuse of a client's funds. The OPC 
subsequently filed a formal complaint against Johnson on 
May 20, 1997, charging that he violated rule 1.15 of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by misappropriating 
$ 28,800 of client money. The Bar moved for summary 
judgment, which the trial court granted. Following a 
sanctions hearing, the court disbarred Johnson for mis-
appropriation [***4] of client funds based on the fol-
lowing findings of undisputed fact: 
Johnson held the client's $ 28,800 in a trust account. 
Mr. Johnson attempted to deliver the $ 28,800 to the 
client and those funds were returned to Mr. Johnson . . . . 
Mr. Johnson placed the client's $ 28,800 in trust and 
agreed to hold the client funds in trust pending a resolu-
tion of their differences. 
Thereafter the client requested the return of the 
funds, but Mr. Johnson did not return the $ 28,800. 
Mr. Johnson converted the $ 28,800 for his own use. 
Mr. Johnson offered no satisfactory explanation of 
why he kept the $ 28,800. His explanation of expenses 
for the threatened malpractice action by the client against 
Mr. Johnson is not a satisfactory explanation. 
Johnson was granted a stay of the judgment of dis-
barment pending any appeal 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P3] [HN1] This court is charged with governing 
the conduct and discipline of those admitted to practice 
law in this state. Thus in reviewing attorney discipline 
cases, "while we review the trial court's finding of facts 
under the clearly erroneous standard, we reserve the right 
to draw different inferences from the facts than [***5] 
those drawn by the trial court." In re Discipline of 1 nee, 
957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted); see 
also In re Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P2d207, 213 (Utah 
1997). In addition, "our constitutional [**884] respon-
sibility requires us to make an independent determination 
as to the [correctness of the discipline actually im-
posed]." lncef 957 P.2d at 1236. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P4] We address first whether the trial court's 
sanction of disbarment was appropriate and then turn to 
the issue of whether Johnson was properly granted a stay 
pending this appeal. 
I. DISBARMENT SANCTION 
[*P5] Attorney discipline sanctions are governed 
by the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, chapter 
15 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. 
These standards state that the purpose of sanctioning an 
attorney is to ensure and maintain the high standard of 
professional conduct required of those who undertake the 
discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and 
to protect the public and the administration of justice 
from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct 
that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge 
[***6] properly their professional responsibilities. 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions rule 1.1. 
[HN2] Rule 3 of those standards provides that after mis-
conduct has been found, the factors to be considered in 
imposing a sanction include 
"(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or miti-
gating factors." 
[*P6] [HNS] These rules additionally provide that 
an order disbarring an attorney is generally appropriate 
absent mitigating or aggravating circumstances when he 
or she 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as 
defined in Rule 8.4(a), 8.4(d), 8.4(e), or 8.4(f) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit 
the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes 
; iiiPCM V 
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serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, 
or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially seri-
ous interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary 
element of which includes intentional interference with 
the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepre-
sentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation . . . [***7] 
or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions rule 4.2. ' 
1 Rule 6 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions allows a departure from the presump-
tive sanction based on mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances to provide for the flexibility in dis-
cipline required by rule 1.3 of the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
[*P7] Subsection (a) above directs us to rule 8.4 of 
the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for definitions 
of professional misconduct sufficient to trigger the sanc-
tion of disbarment. The first subsection of rule 8.4 pro-
vides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to 
"violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or 
do so through [***8] the acts of another." Utah R. Profl 
Conduct 8.4(a). 
[*P8] The trial court held that Mr. "Johnson vio-
lated rule 1.15(a), 1.15(b), and 1.15(c)... of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct when he intentionally misappropri-
ated [his client's] funds for his personal or business use." 
After determining that Johnson had violated the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the trial court correctly 
weighed mitigating and aggravating factors and deter-
mined that, although Johnson's conduct was not as egre-
gious as that of other attorneys who have been disbarred 
by this court in recent years, disbarment was the appro-
priate remedy under our case law because there were no 
substantial mitigating circumstances. We agree. 
[*P9] We held in Babilis that [HN4] intentional 
misappropriation of a client's funds will result in disbar-
ment absent "truly compelling mitigating circumstances." 
951 P2d 207, 217 [**885] (Utah 1997). We set no 
reason to deviate from this rule. The rule takes into con-
sideration the factors listed in rule 3, including the duty 
violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused, and the existence of aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances. As we stated [***9] in Babilis, 
[ITN5] "intentional misappropriation of a client's funds is 
always indefensible; it strikes at the very foundation of 
the trust and honesty that are indispensable to the func-
tioning of the attorney-client relationship and, indeed, to 
the functioning of the legal profession itself." Id. We will 
not abide such conduct. 
[*P10] Johnson does not dispute the fact that he did 
not return the $ 28,800 to his client upon demand. The 
trial court found that he made no satisfactory explanation 
for this failure. The court weighed the mitigating factors 
presented by Johnson and determined that they were not 
sufficient to warrant a lesser sanction. He contends that 
he "has maintained a practice for many years, which in-
cludes significant pro bono work, involvement in com-
munity organizations, and a good reputation among his 
fellows" and that he "is not the type of individual com-
mitting the type of acts" requiring disbarment. [HN6] 
Although a good reputation and community service are 
commendable, they do not constitute "truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances" when there has been a misap-
propriation of client's funds. Id. at 217. 
[*P11] In addition, Johnson contends [***10] that 
the entire circumstances surrounding the misappropria-
tion is a mitigating circumstance. Although he does not 
dispute that he used the $ 28,800 for personal or business 
purposes, he asserts that there is a question of fact about 
whether the client was even entitled to that money. He 
argues that when the client, after rejecting his tender of 
the money, terminated the attorney-client relationship 
and told him to do with the money what he would, his 
own obligation to keep the money in trust ended. He 
argues further that his client owed him money from other 
transactions including fees for protecting his interest in 
this case, and thus he was entitled to a portion of the $ 
28,800 he initially tendered. We disagree. 
[*P12] [HN7] The Rules of Professional Conduct 
require that in the case of a dispute over funds, the attor-
ney is to maintain those funds in a separate trust account 
until the dispute is resolved. Utah R. Profl Conduct 
1.15(c). Johnson tendered $ 28,800 as the client's portion 
of the settlement funds. Pending resolution of the dispute 
with his client over ownership of those funds, he was 
required to maintain them in a separate trust account. 2 
Neither of the factors he presents [***1 1] as mitigating 
the presumptive sanction of disbarment is "truly compel-
ling," and we therefore affirm the trial court's order.3 
2 Even Johnson asserts that he was entitled only 
to "an offset to some portion of the $ 28,800," not 
the entire amount. He knew his client did not 
mean to give him a gift of the money. 
3 [HN8] Once an attorney's conduct has been 
found to fall within rule 4.2 of the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the presumptive 
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sanction is disbarment. There is no additional 
burden to show aggravating circumstances; the 
absence of aggravating factors is not a mitigating 
factor. 
[*P13] Johnson also contends that "absent a finding 
by the trial court of 'serious criminal conduct'" his case 
does not meet the requirements for presumptive disbar-
ment in rule 4.2. We reject that argument here as we did 
in Babilis. First, disbarment is appropriate when an at-
torney's conduct falls within any one of the three subsec-
tions of rule 4.2*. The trial court's finding that Johnson 
knowingly violated [***12] rule 1.15 of the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct for his own benefit was suffi-
cient to support his disbarment. As we earlier stated, this 
conduct seriously injures, at the very least, the public and 
the legal system. Second, the intentional misappropria-
tion of client funds falls within the description of "other 
intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation" referred to in subsection (c) of 
rule 4.2.4 
4 Johnson also asserts that disbarment is too 
harsh for his conduct because it "did not [even 
approach] the dishonest, egregious conduct" of 
Babilis. He argues instead that his situation is 
more akin to that of In re Cassity, the case of an 
attorney who was put on probation after receiving 
a public reprimand for failing to remit to his cli-
ent her rightful portion of settlement proceeds. 
See In re Complaint of Cassity, 875 P.2d 548 
(Utah 1994). Cassity was decided before we 
enunciated a firm rule in Babilis and may well 
have been decided differently today. 
[***33] [**886] [*pi4] We do not administer 
the sanction of disbarment lightly; we understand its 
devastating effects on an attorney. However, we are 
charged with protecting the public and the legal system 
of our state from those attorneys who do not abide by 
their professional responsibilities, and we cannot tolerate 
the intentional misappropriation of a client's funds. Thus 
we affirm the disbarment. 
II. STAY PENDING APPEAL 
[*P15] In appealing from the order granting John-
son's motion for a stay pending his appeal to this court, 
the OPC seeks "guidance on the important issue of the 
availability for stays of judgment in cases in which the 
district court has determined that the attorney's miscon-
duct is so serious that it warrants disbarment." Our reso-
lution of this issue today cannot affect the parties in this 
action and is therefore moot. [HN9] We generally refrain 
from deciding moot questions because of our policy 
against issuing advisory opinions. In re Giles, 657 P.2d 
285, 286 (Utah 1982). However, this case warrants an 
exception to this policy because the issue is one of wide 
public concern, and because of the short period any one 
litigant is affected by it, the issue is [***14] '"capable of 
repetition yet evading review.'" ld.\ see also KUTV v. 
Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1983); Wickham v. 
Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1981). 
[*P36] The standard a trial court must follow in 
granting an attorney's motion for stay of a judgment of 
sanction pending appeal of that judgment is a question of 
first impression in this court. We look to the rules gov-
erning attorney discipline proceedings to resolve it. 
[HN10] Rule 17 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability provides that unless otherwise noted, "the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, [and] the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure governing civil appeals . . . apply in 
formal discipline actions." Utah R. Civ. P. 17. [HN11] 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure pro-
vides that a stay of a judgment or order of a district court 
pending appeal must generally be sought in the district 
court. Utah R. Civ. P. 8. [HN12] Rule 62 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court can 
grant a motion for stay pending appeal "in its discretion 
and on such conditions for the security of the adverse 
party as are proper." Utah R. Civ. P. 62(a). 
[*P17] [HN13] Pursuant to our [***15] constitu-
tional charge to "govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline 
of persons admitted to practice law," Utah Const art. 
VIII, § 4, we enunciate a standard to guide the discretion 
of the district court in determining whether to stay a 
judgment of sanction pending appeal of that judgment to 
this court. Rule 18(a) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability provides that a district court can grant a 
motion for interim suspension when an attorney "poses a 
substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public" 
pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding. 
Although we recognize that an order of interim suspen-
sion is different from a final judgment of sanction in that 
the latter is based on a final determination of misconduct 
following a trial, the standard fits well in both situations 
and we adopt a modified version of it here. When an 
attorney can meet the burden of demonstrating to the trial 
court's satisfaction that his or her continued practice of 
law pending appeal does not pose a substantial threat of 
irreparable harm to the public, the trial court may, in its 
discretion, grant the stay. Under this standard, [***16] 
cases where the attorney's misconduct was a one-time 
incident as opposed to a pattern of misconduct over a 
period of time will probably be the most likely instances 
where a stay would be appropriate. We do not require, 
however, that the attorney also demonstrate that he or 
she has issues which are likely to result in reversal on 
appeal as we do in criminal cases where a convicted 
criminal defendant seeks a stay pending appeal. See Utah 
"UKG19 
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R. Crim. P. 27(d)(2). [HIM 14] The discipline of an attor-
ney is a civil case and the ultimate power to discipline is 
vested in this court under the Utah Constitution. The 
district courts in hearing the discipline cases act only as 
our agent. Because the private practice of law cannot 
easily be stopped and started again, unless there is a sub-
stantial threat of irreparable harm to the public, a dis-
barred lawyer should be entitled to a stay [**887] of 
judgment pending appeal to this court where the final 
authority for discipline rests. 
[*P18] The trial court found that "the likelihood of 
harm to the public should Johnson be allowed to practice 
law during the pendency of this appeal is slim." We 
agree. Johnson's conduct warranting disbarment was a 
serious one-time [***]7]~ offense and not a continuing 
pattern of misconduct that was likely to recur while he 
was allowed to continue to practice pending his appeal to 
this court. 
[*P19] The judgment of disbarment is affirmed. 
The trial court did not en* in granting Johnson's motion 
for a stay pending his appeal to this court. 
[*P20] Associate Chief Justice Russon and Justice 
Durrant concur in Chief Justice Howe's opinion. 
CONCUR BY: DURHAM; WILK1NS 
DISSENT BY: DURHAM; WILKINS 
DISSENT 
DURHAM, Justice, concurring and dissenting: 
[*P21] I concur in Part 1 of the majority opinion, 
but cannot join Part II. This court is charged by the Utah 
Constitution with the obligation to regulate the practice 
of law. We have delegated the screening, fact-finding, 
and initial judgment regarding discipline to the Utah 
State Bar and to the district courts, but we retain the final 
authority to oversee the system. When the prosecuting 
entity and the disciplined attorney accede to the appro-
priateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the 
trial courts, or at least fail to challenge it, we lend our 
constitutional authority to the finality of the determina-
tion. Such trial court decisions, of course, create no 
precedent [***18] for the disposition of other cases. 
Where a sanction is challenged, however, this court un-
dertakes a function that goes beyond the review of an 
individual case. We arbitrate questions of proportional-
ity, rules of law, and guidelines for the imposition of 
sanctions that have general application for the practice of 
law in Utah. Our decisions interpret the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and develop the principles of application 
that will guide lawyers, the Bar, and the trial courts. 
[*P22] Given the significance of our institutional 
role in the process of imposing sanctions, 1 am troubled 
by the procedural analysis of my colleagues. Disbarment 
is the "ultimate" sanction in the context of disciplinary 
proceedings. Once it is effected, there is, in a profes-
sional sense, no turning back. A disbarred lawyer must 
instantly close his practice, dismiss his clients, and re-
move himself from all litigation and transactions in 
which he has been engaged as a lawyer. There is little 
likelihood that a practice could be restored or regener-
ated if this court were to reverse the sanction after ap-
peal, particularly given the many months required to 
resolve such appeals. 
[*P23] Trial courts have [***19] a more limited 
perspective on the disciplinary/ system than does this 
court. A trial judge is often called on to "predict" the 
answer to a question of first impression involving the 
rules and the scope of appropriate sanctions. It is not at 
all unexpected that a trial judge's best assessment of the 
trend of developing law turns out to be "wrong" in the 
sense that this court will reject it and opt for a different 
interpretation or policy. Where the judgment is equiva-
lent to a professional death penalty, I believe that this 
court's review should precede execution. 
[*P24] This case presents a useful example. The 
facts ultimately support the sanction of disbarment, but it 
is in my view a very close question. An otherwise up-
right and commendable lawyer has committed one enor-
mous error of judgment and behavior, for which he is to 
experience the complete loss of his career and reputation. 
It has been a very difficult decision for at least this mem-
ber of the court to disbar. Simultaneously, this lawyer's 
misconduct, although meriting disbarment, constituted 
no interim danger to the public whatsoever during the 
pendency of the appeal. Had this court disagreed with the 
trial judge on the [***20] sanction, and had there been 
no stay of execution, a career might have been disman-
tled unnecessarily. I therefore take a view different from 
any of those supported by my colleagues. I believe that 
where disbarment is ordered by the trial judge and an 
appeal is taken, there should be an automatic stay unless 
there has been a showing sufficient to support an interim 
suspension under rule 18(a), either in the trial court pro-
ceedings themselves or on motion by the Bar. I don't 
want to overdo the analogy [**888] to the death penalty 
in criminal cases, but I believe that the constitutional 
underpinnings and institutional structure of our discipli-
nary system require this court's review and approval be-
fore a career is terminated. 
WILKINS, Justice, concurring and dissenting: 
[*P25] I concur in part I of Chief Justice Howe's 
opinion. I respectfully dissent to part II. The trial court 
should not have stayed the judgment. 
'US020 
Page 8 
2001 UT110, *;48P.3d881,**; 
437 Utah Adv. Rep. 17; 2001 Utah LEXIS 195, *** 
[*P26] 1 agree that once a judgment of disbarment 
is entered by the trial court, the burden should be on the 
lawyer to seek, and establish adequate grounds for, a stay 
of the disbarment pending review by this court. The ob-
ligation is on the lawyer to prove [***21] the entitle-
ment to a stay by demonstrating to the trial court that the 
lawyer does not pose a substantial threat of irreparable 
harm to the public during the course of the review. 
Moreover, even making such a motion and showing 
should not entitle the disbarred lawyer to a stay of the 
disbarment pending review. Quite the contrary, the trial 
judge, acting as our agent in this type of proceeding, has 
broad discretion in deciding whether or not a stay is ap-
propriate. In my opinion, we are unwise to create a pre-
sumption in favor of granting a stay. It would be better to 
require the disbarred lawyer to convince the trial court, 
or us, that he or she has a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on review by this court before granting a stay. 
[*P27] At risk here is not only the livelihood of the 
lawyer, but the confidence of the public in the court's 
ability to police the ranks of those admitted to practice 
law. An interim suspension should be imposed when 
needed to protect the public. A disbarment should be 
effective when entered by the trial court, under all but the 
most unusual circumstances. Only when the lawyer can 
demonstrate that the disbarment is likely to be reversed 
on review [***22] by this court should the public be 
required to suffer continued exposure to the disbarred 
lawyer. Our duty to protect the public is higher than any 
duty to the disbarred lawyer, once the lawyer has been 
accorded a full measure of due process and evenhanded 
justice by the trial court. Only when the quality of that 
justice is in real doubt should a stay be granted. 
'U*021 
Rule 14-603. Sanctions. 
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or 
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct. 
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A 
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525. 
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law 
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be 
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in 
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more 
than three years. 
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be 
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524. 
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may be 
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525. 
(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a 
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth 
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519. 
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the 
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the condupt of 
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under 
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone 
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of 
readmission or reinstatement 
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a 
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of 
law while either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the 
respondent. Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in 
Rule 14-521. 
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be 
imposed include: 
(i)(1) restitution; 
(i)(2) assessment of costs; 
(i)(3) limitation upon practice; 
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver; 
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or professional 
responsibility examination; and 
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses. 
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary 
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another 
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Rule 14-604. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding 
of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Rule 14-605. Imposition of sanctions. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the 
lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or 
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, 
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of 
these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in 
Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, 
the public, or the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice 
law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to 
a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, 
but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this rule 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
f<l)tfG29 
Rule 14-606. Prior discipline orders. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in cases involving 
prior discipline. 
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon a 
lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order. 
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer has 
previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will generally be one level 
more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously received, provided that the 
harm requisite for the higher sanction is present. 
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and mitigation. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to 
impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline 
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply 
with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, 
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences 
of the misconduct involved; and 
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or 
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 
Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems; 
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of 
the misconduct involved; 
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(b)(7) good character or reputation; 
(b)(8) physical disability; 
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; 
and 
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and 
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that 
the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay; 
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or 
impairment; 
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(b)(13) remorse; and 
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered 
as either aggravating or mitigating: 
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution; 
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain. 
"Ufi025 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396 
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 568-9191 
Fax: (801)568-9196 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TINA S. PUGH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ROBERT K. PUGH, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S ANSWERS TO 
RESPONDENT'S 
1
 INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS AND REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 064900887 
Judge Roth 
Commissioner Casey 
Petitioner Tina Simmons Pugh by and through her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, 
respectfully submit the following answers to Respondent's Interrogatories, Requests for 
Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions: 
INTERROGATORIES 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1 through 7: See answers to said Interrogatories 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
f
'Uft026 
OF!! ElV£D 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
ANSWERS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 through 12: 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 1 through 7: Deny each and every request.. 
DATED this / ) day of May, 2006. 
Richard S. Nemelka 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
TINA SIMMONS PUGH being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states that 
she is the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter and that she has read the foregoing Answers to 
Respondent's Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admissions, that she knows the contents thereof and acknowledges the contents therein and that 
they are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief. 
DATED this /A day of May, 2006. 
; / 7 r ^ f rr^t 
ETNA SIMMOKS PUGH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [fr day of May, 2006. 
STEPHEN NEMELKA! Ei*6e south' 1300 &* 1 
Notary Public and Seal 
NUfiG£7 
Answers to Interrogatories 
1. Loanology: $5.25 an hour, 40 hours a week 
Commission average: $300 a month 
2. Tarn seeldng alimony based on the fact that I moved out of my home, sold my car, 
quit nryjob and started a new life with Robert. I was fine on my-erWn^ Hll Robert 
came alon^aiijimade me dependant upon him and his sppp^rt. He placed me in a 
position were IcaJi^tcurrently provide for mysglf^nd will take some time to be 
able to establish mysen^fe^acar, buy th^ircrtne I am in, and employment to 
meet my needs. I have 5 cMldre&^^ave been up rooted from their home and 
we trying to start over inopi^tfew home^xs^ood Chuck. Robert promise to 
provide for me tol^EB^e loved me, wanted meTfr-hsvea nice car, a nice place to 
live and woiiW^pfovide those things for me. He startedaBilsiagJiie only two 
wee^s-after our marriage. I could no longer live in that situation and^cmiyjeft 
1
 5cause of his abuse. 
I have interest in Advantage Property Investments. 
a. Tina Simmons and John Michael Flygare 
b. I am a member 
d. See attached 
4. This is premature since the house is not currently available for me to purchase. 
5. No, Robert knew that before our first date. He told his girlfriend (Kathy) that 
before he asked me to marry him. She asked him if he was sure about it since she 
knew he wanted a child. He told her he was sure. 
6. Yes 
7. None 
Requests for Production of Documents: 
2 "
 ttace
 Lmi(n^^^^f5^/n« 
3. Robert has all of my records - Cost $39.00 per year and take 60 days to receive 
4. Robert has all of my records <Dwiu ^QM £00^ 6dlcPu^ojL 5.^an0fl„dS T U^^H <XCg^ 
7. Attached and Robert has others ^ )"* r ~V- / 
8. Attached and Robert has others 
9. Attached and Robert has all others 
10. Attached 
11. -Attaziied-ailOBberN]^^ '-fl (TKQ_ 
12. Robert has all of my records 
I DO NOT ADMIT TO ANY OF THE ADMMISSION 
•
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LOANOLOGY, LLC 
GENERAL ACCOUNT 
488E6400S#125 
MURRAY, UT 84107-7589 
CHASE © 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N A 
Salt Lake City Utah 84101 
97-154/1240 
4/20/2006 
PAY TO THE ADVICE OF DEPOSIT - NON-NEGOTIABLE 
ORDER OF $ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * : M r * * ^ 
Tina Simmons Pugh 
DOL 
MEMO: Pay Period: 04/01/2006 - 04/15/2006 Direct Deposit NON-NEGOTIABLE 
I I 'OE l a ^ M ' i : I ai,OLU5»* Si: &q?L i io&un' 
LOANOLOGY, LLC 
GENERAL ACCOUNT 
Employee 
21 
Status (Fed/State) Allowances/Extra 
Tina Simmons Pugh, 8346 Willow Creek Drive, Sandy, UT 84093 
Earnings and Hours 
Salary 
Hourly Rate 
Deductions From Gross 
Qty Rate Current 
455 00 
455 00 
Current 
YTD Amount 
1,820 00 
5,763 75 
7,583 75 
YTD Amount 
Health Insurance Emp 
Taxes 
Social Security Employee 
Medicare Employee 
Federal Withholding 
UT - Withholding 
-29 40 
.Current 
"-26 39 
-6 17 
-32 56 
Married using Single Rate/Married 
Pay Period 04/01/2006 - 04/15/2006 
Direct Deposit 
Fed-5/0/UT-5/0 
Pay Date 04/20/2006 
Amc 
*5639 18' 
-235 20 
YTD Amount 
-455 61 
-106 55 
-307 00 
-208 46 
"-1,077 62 
c 
CD 
Adjustments to Net Pay 
Dental "Se^cf 
Child Support Garnishment 
Net Pay 
Current YTD Amount 
-16 28 
-191 14 
-207 42 
185 62 
-130 24 
-573 42 
-703 66 
5,567 27 
Why Mark Flygare should pay attorney fees: 
1. As shown Mark continued to deny phone calls and cause problems 
2. As to current date since last court meeting 
a. 5/9/06 called left message and only Michael, Sean and Thomas called 
back 
b. 5/10/06 called left message and only Natalie and Jessica called back 
3. This has been going on for 5 years 
4. Please review case for history of violation of court order by Mark. 
Tina income is: Minimum wage at 40 hours a week. 
She is current on all child support. 
Department of the Treasury — Interna! Revenue Service 
1 0 4 0 A U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (99) 2004 IRS Use Only — Do not write or staple in this .space. 
Del 
Instructions.) 
the 
label. 
rwise, 
•e print 
sidential 
ction 
npaign 
instructions.) 
mg 
ttus 
;konly 
box. 
Your first name and initial 
Tina 
Last name 
H Simmons 
If a pint return, spouse's first name and initial Last name 
Home address (number and street). If you have a P.O. box, see instructions. Apartment no. 
City, town or post office. If you have a foreign address, see instructions. State ZIP code 
OMB No 1545-O0B5 
Your social security number 
Spouse's social security number 
A I m p o r t a n t ! A 
You must enter your 
SSN(s) above. 
k Note. Checking 'Yes' will not change your tax or reduce your refund. 
~ Do you, or your spouse if filing a joint return, want $3 to go to this fund? 
You 
+* f l Y e s [xJNo 
Spouse 
flYes [~| No 
Single 
I I Married filing jointly (even if only one had income) 
Married filing separately. Enter spouse's SSN above and 
full name here • 
[x] Head of household (with qualifying person). (See instructions.) 
If the qualifying person is a child but not your dependent, 
enter this child's name here •• 
[ j Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child 
(see instructions) 
emptions 
>re than six 
indents, 
instructions. 
6 a JXJ Yourself. If someone can claim you as a dependent, do not check box Ba. 
b I I Spouse . . . . 
Boxes 
|— checked on 
6a and 6b -
c Dependents: 
(1) First name Last name 
J o h n M F l y g a r e 
(2) Dependent's 
social security 
number 
(3) Dependent's 
relationship 
to you 
Son 
( 4 ) v t f 
qualifying 
child for 
child tax 
credit 
d Total number of exemptions claimed 
No. of children 
on 6c who : 
• lived 
with you . . . 
• did not 
live with 
you due to 
divorce or 
separation . • 
Dependen t s 
on 6c not 
entered above 
Add numbers 
on lines above 
some 
ich Form(s) 
; here. Also 
ch Form(s) 
9-Riftax 
; withheld. 
iu did not 
aW-2, 
instructions. 
lose, but 
IOI attach, 
payment. 
7 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Attach Form(s) W-2 
B a Taxable interest Attach Schedule 1 if required 
b Tax-exempt interest Do not include on line 8a 8b 
9 a Ordinary dividends. Attach Schedule 1 if required * . . 
1 7 , 3 8 2 , 
6a 
9a 
b Qualified dividends (see instructions) 9b 
10 Capital gain distributions (see instructions) 
11a IRA distributions 11a 11b Taxable amount 
10 
11b 
12 a Pensions and annuities 12 a 12 b Taxable amount 12b 
13 Unemployment compensation and Alaska 
Permanent Fund dividends 13 
14 a Social security 
benefits 14 a 14b Taxable amount 14b 
15 Add lines 7 through 14b (far right column). This is your total income. 15 1 7 , 3 8 2 . 
ijusted 
OSS 
come 
16 Educator expenses (see instructions) 16 
17 IRA deduction (see instructions) 17 
18 Student loan interest deduction (see instructions) 18 
19 Tuition and fees deduction (see instructions) 19 
20 Add lines 16 through 19. These are your total adjustments 20 
21 Subtract line 20 from line 15. This is your adjusted gross income . •- 21 1 7 , 3 8 2 , 
JK For Disclosure, Privacy Act, and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see instructions. Form 1040A (2004) 
FDIA1312 10/28/04 
Form 1D40A (20D4) T i n a H Simmons 
Tax, 
credits, 
and 
payments 
22 Enter the amount from line 21 (adjusted gross income) 22 
23 a Check 0 Blind Blind J Total boxes checked • 23 a 
Standard 
Deduction 
f o r -
• People who 
checked any 
box on line 
23a or 23b or 
who can be 
claimed as a 
dependent, 
see 
instructions. 
• All others: 
Single or 
Marned filing 
separately, 
$4,850 
Married filing 
jointly or 
Qualifying 
widow(er), 
$9,700 
Head of 
Household, 
$7,150 
1 
You were born before January 2,1940, 
Spouse was bom before January 2,1940, 
b If you are married filing separately and your spouse itemizes deductions, .—M**^ •»«* 
see instructions and check here >• 23 b | j 
24 Enter your standard deduction (see left margin) 24 
25 Subtract line 24 from line 22. If line 24 is more than line 22, enter 0 25 
26 If line 22 is $107,025 or less, multiply $3,100 by the total number of exemptions claimed 
on line 6d. If line 22 is over $107,025, see the worksheet in the instructions 26 
27 Subtract line 26 from line 25. If line 26 is more than line 25, enter -0-. This is your 
taxable income •• 2 7 
If you have [_ 
a qualifying 
child, attach r-
Schedule EIC. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Credit for child and dependent care expenses. 
Attach Schedule 2 29 
Credit for the elderly or the disabled. Attach Schedule 3 . . . . 30 
Education credits. Attach Form 8B63 31 
Retirement savings contributions credit. Attach Form BBBO . . 32 
Child tax credit (see instructions) 33 
Adoption credit. Attach Form BB39 34 
4 0 3 . 
Add lines 29 through 34. These are your total credits 35 
Subtract line 35 from line 28. If line 35 is more than line 28, enter-0- 36 
Advance earned income credit payments from Form(s) W-2 37 
Add lines 36 and 37. This is your total tax 
Federal income tax withheld from Forms W-2 and 1099 *. . 
38 
- . . . * . 39 
2004 estimated tax payments and amount applied from 
2003 return 40 
1 , 3 8 4 . 
41 a Earned Income credit (EIC) 41 a 
b Nontaxable combat pay election. 41 b 
42 Additional child tax credit. Attach Form 8B12 42 
43 Add hnes 39,40,41a, and 42. These are your total payments 
2 , 0 7 1 . 
5 9 7 . 
43 
rage t 
1 7 , 3 8 2 . 
7 , 1 5 0 . 
1 0 , 2 3 2 . 
6 , 2 0 0 . 
4 , 0 3 2 . 
28 Tax, including any alternative minimum tax 
(see instructions) 28 4 0 3 . 
4 0 3 , 
0 . 
4 , 0 5 2 . 
Refund 
Direct deposit? 
See instructions 
and fill in 45b, 
45c, and 45d. 
• 45a 
44 If line 43 is more than line 38, subtract line 38 from line 43. 
This is the amount you overpaid 44 
45 a Amount of line 44 you want refunded to you 
*" b Routing 
number . . . 
K
 d Account 
number . . . 
XXXXXXXXX c Type: \] Checking [ J Savings 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
46 Amount of line 44 you want applied to your 2005 
estimated tax 46 
Amount 
you owe 
47 Amount you owe. Subtract line 43 from line 38. For details on hDW to pay, 
see instructions 47 
48 Estimated tax penalty (see instructions) 48 
4 , 0 5 2 . 
4 , 0 5 2 . 
Do you want to allow another person to discuss this return with the IRS (see instructions)? \_j Yes. Complete the following. JXJ Nc Third party 
designee 
Designee's Phone 
no. 
Personal 
identification 
number(PIN) 
Sign 
here 
Joint return? 
See instructions. 
Keep a copy 
for your records. 
Under penalties of penury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they 
are true, correct, and accurately list all amounts and sources of income I received dunng the tax year. Declaration of preparer (other than the taxpayer) is based on all 
information of which the preparer has any knowledge. 
Your signature I Date I Your occupation I Daytime phone number 
Manager 
Spouse's signature If a joint return, both must sign Date Spouse's occupation 
Paid 
preparer's 
use only 
Preparer's . 
signature m> 
Date Check if 
self- i—i 
employed j 
Preparer's SSN or PTIN 
Firm's name 
(or yours If self-
employed), 
address, and 
ZIP code 
-S?2-£zPSf~£?-I'^(L 
EIN 
Phone 
\ no 
FDJA1312 10/28/04 Form 1040A (2004) 
;HEDUL& t i t ; 
>rm 1040A or 1040) 
»artment of the Treasury 
mat Revenue Service 
n a m e u inuu iuc U I C U H 
Qualifying Child information 
Complete and attach to Form 1040A or 1040 
only if you have a qualifying child. ** * ' »« • * • ,m 
ie(s) shown on return 
„xia H Simmons 
2004 
43 
Your social security number 
ifore you begin: See the instructions for Form 1040A, lines 41a and 41b, or Form 1040, lines 65a and 65b, to make sure that (a) you can take the EIC and (b) you have a qualifying child. 
• If you take the EIC even though you are not eligible, you may not be allowed to take the credit for up to 10 years. See the 
instructions for details. 
dJTION: • It will take us longer to process your return and issue your refund if you do not fill in all lines that apply for each qualifying child. 
• Be sure the child's name on line 1 and social security number (SSN) on line 2 agree with the child's social security card. 
Otherwise, at the time we process your return, we may reduce or disallow your EIC. If the name or SSN on the child's social 
security card is not correct, call the Social Security Administration at 1-800-772-1213. 
jalifying Child Information 
1 Child's name 
If you have more than two qualifying children, you only 
have to list two to get the maximum credit 
2 Child's SSN 
The child must have an SSN as defined in the 
Form 1040A or Form 1040 instructions unless the 
child was bom and died in 2004. If your child was 
bom and died in 2004 and did not have an SSN, 
enter 'Died' on this line and attach a copy of the 
3 Child's year of birth 
4 If the child was bom before 1986 — 
a Was the child under age 24 at the end of 2004 and 
a student? 
b Was the child permanently and totally disabled 
during any part of 2004? 
5 Child's relationship to you 
(for example, son, daughter, grandchild, niece, nephew, 
6 Number of months child lived with you in the United 
States during 2004 j 
• If the child lived with you for more than half of 2004 
but less than 7 months, enter T . 
• If the child was born or died in 2004 and your home 
was the child's home for the entire time he or she 
was alive during 2004, enter'12' 
Child 1 
First name Last name 
John M F l y g a r e 
Year 1989 
If bom after 1985, skip lines 4a 
and 4b; go to line 5. 
• Yes. • No. 
Go to line 5. Continue 
• Yes. []No. 
Continue The child is not a 
qualifying child. 
Son 
7_ months 
Do not enter more than 12 months. 
Child 2 
First name Last name 
Year 
If bom after 1985, skip lines 4a 
and 4b; go to line 5. 
QYes. •No. 
Go to line 5. Continue 
• Yes. QNO. 
Continue The child is not a 
qualifying child. 
months 
Do not enter more than 12 months. 
You may also be able to take the additional child tax credit if your child (a) was under age 17 at the end of 2004, (b) is claimed as 
T IP your dependent on line 6c of Form 1040A or Form 1040, and (c) is a U.S. citizen or resident alien. For more details, see the 
instructions for line 42 of Form 1040A or line 67 of Form 1040. 
AA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see Form 1040A or 1040 instructions. Schedule EIC (Form 1040A or 1040) 2004 
FDJA7401 11/02/04 
<U^036 
Form O O 1 C 
Department of the Treasury . 
Internal Revenue Service (99) 
Additional UhUd laxuredi t 
Complete and attach to Form 1040 or Form 1040A. 
2004 
Attachment - — 
Sequence No 4 7 
Name(s) shown on return 
T i n a H Simmons 
Your social security number 
wm 
AH Fliers 
1 Enter the amount from line 1 of your Child Tax Credit Worksheet in the Form 1040 or Form 1040A 
instructions. \1 you used Publication 972, enter the amount from line 8 of the worksheet on page 4 
of the publication 
2 Enter the amount from Form 1040, line 51, or Form 1040A, line 33 . - . 
3 Subtract line 2 from line 1. If zero, stop; you cannot take this credit. . . 
4 a Enter your total earned income. See the instructions 
b Nontaxable combat pay included on line 4a | 4b] 
5 Is the amount on line 4a more than $10,750? 
| No. Leave line 5 blank and enter -0- on line 6. 
Yes. Subtract $10,750 from the amount on line 4a Enter the result. 
1 7 , 3 8 2 . 
6 , 6 3 2 , 
6 Multiply the amount on line 5 by 15% (.15) and enter the result 
Next. Do you have three or more qualifying children? 
|x] No. If line 6 is zero, stop; you cannot take this credit Otherwise, skip Part II and enter the smaller of 
line 3 or line 6 on line 13. 
[ ] ] Yes. If line 6 is equal to or more than line 3, skip Part II and enter the amount from line 3 on line 13. 
Otherwise, go to line 7. 
1 , 0 0 0 . 
4 0 3 . 
5 9 7 . 
Certain Filers Who Have Three or More Qualifying Children 
7 Enter the total of the withheld social security and Medicare taxes 
from Form(s) W-2, boxes 4 and 6. If married filing jointly, include 
your spouse s amounts with yours, if you worked for a railroad, 
see the instructions 
8 1040 fliers: Enter the total of the amounts from Form 1040, 
lines 30 and 58, plus any uncollected social security 
and Medicare or tier 1 RRTA taxes included on line 62. 
1040A fliers: Enter-0-. 
9 Add lines 7 and 8 
10 1040 filers: Enter the total of the amounts from Form 1040, lines 
55a and 66. 
1040A filers: Enter the total of the amount from Form 1040A, line 41a, 
plus any excess social security and tier 1 RRTA taxes 
withheld that you entered to the left of line 43 
(see instructions). 10 
11 Subtract line 10 from line 9. If zero or less, enter-0- 11 
12 Enter the larger of line 6 or line 11 here 
Next, enter the smaller of line 3 or line 12 on line 13. 
12 
EBBBlffl Your Additional Child Tax Credit 
13 This is your additional child tax credit 13 5 9 7 . 
Enter this amount on 
Form 1040, line 67, or 
Form 1040A, line 42, 
BAA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see instructions. FormB812 (2004) 
FD1A3001 11/09/D4 
H I * 
,2120 
December 20D2) 
irtment of the Treasury 
m\ Revenue Service 
s(s) shown on return 
na H Simmons 
Multiple Support Declaration 
• Attach to Form 1040 or Form 1040A. 
OMBNo 1545-0071 
114 
Your social security number 
ing the calendar year 2 0 0 4 the eligible persons listed below each paid over 10% of the support of: 
hn M Flygare 
Name of person supported 
ave a signed statement from each eligible person waiving his or her right to claim this person as a dependent for any tax year that began in 
\ above calendar year. 
•hn Flygare 
bie person s name Social security number 
UT 
ress (number, street, apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code) 
ible person's name Social secunty number 
ress (number, street., apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code) 
ible person's name Soaal secunty number 
Iress (number, street, apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code) 
[ible person's name Social security number 
jress (number, street, apartment number, city, state, and ZIP code) 
KA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see separate instructions. Form 2120 (Rev 12-2002) 
FDIA29D1 12/27/02 
'IJ'-fiSi 
2 0 04 COLORADO INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN SUMMARY 
Taxable Income $ 4,032.00 
Total Tax $ 113.00 
Total Payments/Credits $ 382.00 
Amount to be Refunded $ 269.00 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTRONICALLY FILING YOUR RETURN 
If you are filing your return electronically, make sure you come 
back to TurboTax in 24 to 48 hours to check the status of your 
return. You will receive instructions at that time on how to 
complete the electronic filing process. Follow those instructions. 
IMPORTANT: DO NOT mail a copy of your tax return to the state 
taxing authority. They already received an electronic copy of your 
tax return. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAILING YOUR RETURN (NOT FOR USERS WHO FILE ELECTRONICALLY) 
Your Colorado Form 104 shows a refund of $269.00. 
Please mail your return to the following address by April 15, 2005*: 
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE 
DENVER, CO 80261-0005 
Be sure to sign and date your return and include the proper amount 
of postage on the envelope. 
Page 1 KEEP THIS PAGE FOR YOUR RECORDS --DO NOT MAIL. 'Uft039 
)04 FORM 104 COLORADO INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 
(13) •ESIDENCY 
STATUS ,_,.
 t v | 
:HECK ONE) <53) EJ 
FULL-YEAR RESIDENT(S) 
PART-YEAR RESIDENT(S) OR NONRESIDENT(S) 
(or resident, part-year, nonresident combinations) 
For calendar year 2004 or fiscal year 
LAST NAME FIRST NAME AND INITIAL DECEASED SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
ireelf 
rnmons T ina H r>Es 
»use, If pint 
FIVES 
Your telephone number 
State ZIP Code 
irora 
tf you use a tax preparer and do not want this booklet mailed to you next year, please check here. 
ENTER AMOUNT from federal Form 1040, line 42; or from federal Form 1040A, line 27; or from federal 
Form 1040EZ, line 6; or from the federal TeleFile worksheet, line K (Federal Taxable income) 
DDITIONS TO FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME 
Enter the amount of the state income tax deduction, if any, you claimed on Schedule A of your 
federal Form 1040, line 5 
ROUND TO THE NEAREST DOLLAR 
Other additions, explain 
1 
. . . . » 2 
• 3 
. Total of lines 1 through 3 4 
JBTRACTIONS FROM FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME 
I Enter the amount of state income tax refund, if any, you reported on line 10 
of your federal Form 1040 • 5 
i United States government interest • 6 
' Pension-annuity subtraction, taxpayer • 7 
l Pension-annuity subtraction, spouse • 8 
I Colorado source capital gain (see FY! income 15) • 9 
I Tuition program contribution • 10 
! Other subtractions, explain: • 11 
I Total of lines 5 through 11 12 
\ COLORADO TAXABLE INCOME, line 4 minus line 12 * 13 
4 , 0 3 2 . |00 
4 , 0 3 2 . 
4 , 0 3 2 . 
00 
00 
GO TO THE TAX TABLE IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WITH YOUR TAXABLE INCOME FROM LINE 13 TO FIND YOUR TAX. 
PART-YEAR RESIDENTS AND NONRESIDENTS GO TO FORM 104PN. FULL-YEAR RESIDENTS ENTER YOUR TAX ON LINE 14. 
(only if 
Colorado 
tax 
withheld is 
reported 
on the 
form) 
INCOME TAX AND CREDITS 
14 COLORADO TAX from the tax table. 
Part-year residents and nonresidents enter tax from line 36, Form 104PN • 14 
15 Alternative minimum tax from Form 104AMT • 15 
1S Recapture of prior year credits • 16 
17 Total of iines 14 through 16 17 
18 Personal credits from line 29, Form 104 CR • 18 
19 Alternative fuel credits from line 32, Form 104 CR • 19 
20 Gross conservation easement credit from line 33, Form 104 CR • 20 
21 Enterprise zone credits from line 43, Form 104 CR • 21 
22 Total of lines 18 through 21 (if more than the total of iines 14 and 15, 
see line 22 instructions) 22 
23 Net tax, line 17 minus line 22 . . 23 
113, 
113, 
0. 
113. 
00 
£0 
9SL 
0£ 
0£ 
£2. 
oo 
00 
00 
00 
COIA0212 11/15/04 
<l^040 
1UJU 
T i n a H 
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E F c 
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 D D D 
M A ' 
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r E 
c 
H 
C E 
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U 1 F 
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 B 
T U C 
A J 0 
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Y 0 0 
N R 
S A 
0 
E 
F 
u 
N 
ID 
U 
M 
o 
N 
T 
|o 
W 
0 
s 
NTE 
o * 
R 
c 
S i m m o n s 
24 Enter the amount from federal f 
or from federal form 1040EZ, li 
(Federal Adjusted Gross Incom 
25 Amount from line 23 on page 1 
orm 1040, line 36; or from federal form 1040A, line 21; 
ne 4; or from the federal TeleFile worksheet, line I 
e) 
of form (Net Tax) 
26 COLORADO INCOME TAX WITHHELD from wage 
27 ESTIMATED TAX payments and credits; extensio 
on nonresident real estate sales and partnership/S c 
28 Child care credit from line 5, Fo 
29 Total of lines 26 through 28 . 
is and winnings 
n payments; and amounts withheld 
:orp/fiduciary income 
rm104CR 
30 If line 29 is more than line 25, subtract line 25 from line 29. 
This is your overpayment 
31 Amount you want credited to your 2005 estimated te 
ENTER THE AMOUNT, IF ANY, YOU WISH T 
32 The Colorado Nongame and Endanaered Wildlife Ft 
33 The Colorado Domestic Abuse 
34 The Colorado Homeless Prever 
35 The Special Olympics Colorado 
36 The Western Colorado State Ve 
Fund 
ition Activities Fund 
Fund 
sterans Cemetery Fu 
IX 
O CONTRIBUTE TO: 
j nd 
nd 
38 The Court-Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) Fund 
39 The Colorado Watershed Prote 
40 The Family Resource Centers F 
41 The Colorado State Fair Authon 
42 The Organ and Tissue Donation Awareness Fund . 
44 Line 30 minus line 43. This is your REFUND 
Direct _ _ 
Deposit • Routing number 1 2 4 0 0 2 9 7 1 Type: |Xj Checking |_J 
Account number 3 6 5 1 0 0 8 8 3 5 
AMOUNT YOU OWE 
46 interest, also include on line 48 
47 Estimated tax penalty, also inciu 
48 if line 25 is more than line 29, subtract line 29 from line 25. This is the 
amount you owe. Include amounts entered as voluntary contributions on lines 
434 
24 
. . 25 
. • 26 
• 27 
. • 28 
29 
3D 
. • 31 
• 32 
. • 33 
. • 34 
• 35 
. • 36 
. . 37 
. • 38 
. • 39 
. • 40 
. • 41 
. • 42 
43 
. • 44 
Savings 
, • 45 
. • 46 
. • 47 
. • 48 
- 5 1 - 6 2 5 6 Page2 
1 7 , 3 8 2 . 
1 1 3 . 
3 8 2 . 
3 8 2 . 
2 6 9 . 
0 . 
0 . 
2 6 9 . 
00 
ool 
00 
00 
00 
ool 
00 
orjl 
00 
ruH 
o"o| 
POM 
ool 
0 0 | 
00 
oTTl 
nn 
00 , 
o o ! 
00 I 
00 | 
00 
00 
00 
nn 
• MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE. If your check is rejected due to 
insufficient or uncollected funds, the 
• To ensure you receive credit for your payment, write your social security number Department of Revenue may collect 
and 'Form 104' on your check. the payment amount directly from 
. DO NOT send cash; DO NOT staple check to return. y 0 U r b a n k i r v g a c C 0 U n t B '«*™ical ly . 
Under penalties of perjury, 1 declare that to the best of my knowledge and belief, this return is true, correct, 
and complete. 
Your Signature 
Date Year of Birth 
1967 
MAIL YOUR RETURN TO: 
OLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE DENVER, 
CO 80261-0005 
Spouse's Signature, If joint return, BOTH must sign. 
Date Year of Birth 
Paid Preparer's Name, Address and Telephone Number 
S e l f p r e p a r e d 
FILE ELECTRONICALLY FOR A FASTER REFUND (SEE INSTRUCTIONS) 
COIA0212 11/15/04 
'U«041 
DRWI104PN - PART-YEAR RESIL^rtJT/NONRESIDENT TAX CALCULATION SCHEDULE 
Attach this form to your completed income tax return Form 104 
2004 
axpayer's Name 
i n a H Simmons 
Sopa! Security Number 
ise this form if you and/or your spouse were a resident of another state for all or part of 2004. This form apportions your gross income so the 
-olorado tax computed from the tax table on your total 2004 income will be reduced to reflect only your Colorado income. This form should be 
smpieted after you have filled out lines 1 through 13 of Form 104. If you filed federal forms 1040NR or Telefiled your federal return, see FYI 
icome 6. 
1 Taxpayer is (check one): 
2 Spouse is (check one): 
Full-Year Nonresident; 
Full-Year Nonresident; 
Part-Year Resident from 
Part-Year Resident from 
3 Check the federal form you filed. 
PC 
1040 
1040A 
1040 EZ 
1040 NR 
Telefiie 
Other 
09/15 /04 to 
/04 to 
1 2 / 3 1 /04 
/04 
Full-Year Resident 
Full-Year Resident 
Federal 
information 
Colorado 
Information 
4 Enter all income from Form 1040 line 7; 1040A line 7; or Form 1040E2 line 1 . 1 7 , 3 8 2 . [00 
Enter income from line 4 that was earned while working in Colorado and/or 
earned while you were a Colorado resident. Part-year residents should include 
moving expense reimbursements only if paid for moving into Colorado 
6 Enter all interest/dividend income from Form 1040 lines Ba and 9a; Form 
1040A lines 8a and 9a; or Form 1040E2line2 , 00 
1 0 , 4 8 5 . 00 
7 Enter income from line 6 that was earned while you were a resident of Colorado 
8 Enter all income from Form 1040 line 19; Form 1040A line 13; or Form 
1040EZIine3 00 
00 
9 Enter income from line 8 that is from State of Colorado unemployment 
benefits; and/or is from another state's benefits that were received while 
you were a Colorado resident 00 
/ou filed federal Form 1040EZ, go to line 24. All others continue with line 10. 
0 Enter all income from Form 1040 lines 13 and 14; or Form 1040A line 10 10 00 
1 Enter income from line 10 that was earned during that part of the year you were 
a Colorado resident and/or was earned on property located in Colorado 11 
2 Enter all income from Form 1040 lines 15b, 16b, and 20b; or Form 1040A 
lines 11b, 12b, and 14b 12 00 
3 Enter income from line 12 that was received during that part of the year you 
were a Colorado resident 13 
00 
00 
fou filed federal Form 1040A, go to line 20. If you filed Form 1040, continue with line 14. 
4 Enter all business and farm income from Form 1040 lines 12 and 18 14 00 
5 Enter income from line 14 that was earned during that part of the year you were 
a Colorado resident and/or was earned from a Colorado operation 15 00 
6 Enteral! Schedule E income from Form 1040 line 17 16 
7 Enter income from line 16 that was earned from Colorado sources; and/or rent 
and royalty income received or credited to your account during that part of the 
year you were a Colorado resident; and/or partnership/S corporation/fiduciary 
income apportioned based on the number of days of Colorado residency during 
the corporation/partnership/fiductary tax year 
00 
17 00 
B Enter all other income from Form 1040 lines 10, 11 and 21, 
(list type 18 
Enter income from line 18 that was earned or received during that part of the 
year you were a Colorado resident and/or was received from Colorado sources 
00 
19 
(list type 
00 
COIA0712 11/12/04 
>i irlClA O 
Federal 
Information 
Colorado 
Information 
20 Total Income. Enter amount from Form 1040 line 22; or Form 1040A line 15 20 1 7 , 3 8 2 . |00 
21 Total Colorado Income. Enter the total from the Colorado column, lines 5, 7, 9, 
11, 13,15, 17 and 19 21 1 0 , 4 6 5 . [00 
22 Enter al! federal adjustments from Form 1040 line 35, or Form 1040A line 20 
(list type ) . 22 00 
23 Enter adjustments from line 22 as follows: 
(list type ) 
• The IRA deduction, educator expenses, business expenses of reservist, 
performing artist and fee-basis government officials, health savings account 
deduction, self-employment tax, self-employed health insurance deduction, 
SEP and SIMPLE deductions are allowed in the ratio of Colorado wages and 
self-employment income to total wages and self-employment income. 
• The student loan interest deduction, alimony, and tuition and fees deduction 
are allowed in the Colorado to federal total income ratio (line 21/line 20) 
• Penalty paid on early withdrawals made while a Colorado resident 
• Moving expenses if you are moving into Colorado, not if you are moving out. 
• For treatment of other adjustments reported on form 1040 line 35, see FYI income 6. 
24 Adjusted Gross Income. Enter amount from Form 1040 line 3B; or Form 
1040A line 21; or Form 1040E2 line 4 24 
23 
1 7 , 3 8 2 . (00 
25 Colorado Adjusted Gross Income. If you filed Form 1040 or 1040A, subtract the 
amount on line 23 of Form 104PN from the amount on line 21 of Form 104PN. If you filed Form 1040EZ, 
enter the total of lines 5, 7 and 9 of Form 104PN 25 
00 
1 0 , 4 8 5 . 00 
26 
27 
Additions to Adjusted Gross income. Enter the amount from line 3 of 
Colorado Form 104 excluding any charitable contribution adjustments 26 00 
Additions to Colorado Adjusted Gross income. Enter any amount from line 26 
that is from non-Colorado state or local bond interest earned while a Colorado 
resident, and/or any lump-sum distribution from a pension or profit sharing plan 
received while a Colorado resident. (See FYI income 5 for treatment of other additions). 27 
ZB Total of lines 24 and 26 28 
29 Total of lines 25 and 27. 
30 Subtractions from Adjusted Gross Income. Enter the amount from line 12 of 
Colorado Form 104 30 
31 Subtractions from Colorado Adjusted Gross Income. Enter any amount from 
line 30 as follows: 
• The state income tax refund subtraction to the extent included on line 19 above, 
• The federal interest subtraction to the extent included on line 7 above, 
• The pension/annuity subtraction and the PERA or School District Number One 
retirement subtraction to the extent included on line 13 above, 
• The Colorado capital gain subtraction to the extent included on line 11 above, 
• For treatment of other subtractions, see FYI income 6. 
32 Modified Adjusted Gross Income. Subtract the amount on line 30 from the 
amount on line 28 32 
33 Modified Colorado Adjusted Gross Income. Subtract the amount on line 31 
from the amount on line 29 
1 7 , 3 8 2 . 00 
29 
00 
31 
1 7 , 3 8 2 . 00 
33 
00 
1 0 , 4 8 5 . 
1 0 , 4 8 5 . 
00 
00 
00 
34 Amount on line 33 divided by the amount on line 32 34 
35 Tax from the tax table based on income reported on Colorado Form 104 line 13 35 
35 Apportioned tax. Amount on line 35 multiplied by the percentage on iine 34. 
Enter here and on Form 104 line 14 35 
6 0 . 3 2 1 0 
1 8 8 . 00 
1 1 3 . 00 
COIA0712 11/12/04 
'URQ48 
,Bar# 
Attorney for 
Address 
Telephone 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
: Financial Declaration 
)?ttihontr, 
vs. : Civil No. 
Judge 
: Commissioner 
Respondent. 
Occupation' . A^&l^4-ary+ 
Employer: j^nn mo log a 
Employer Address. W^S g . ^r^oa> S ^Jo^ 
fajLJcrra i UT &£JCT? 
Number of exemptions claimea ^ 
Birthdate• V J M » 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS & LIABILITIES 
1. GROSS MONTHLY INCOME from' 
Salary and wages, including commissions, 
bonuses, overtime and allowances) 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, 
Child support from any prior marriage 
-1-
n 
etc.) q_ 
A 
MJ'"044 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
All other sources (Specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
A 
c5 
~6 
S Aait> 
MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
Federal income tax 
State income tax 
FICA . 
Health insurance 
Life insurance 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
401(k) 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
$ 0 
JO. 
^S-&2> 
£o- <fr<3 
Other (specify) CM Id S ^ p ^ ^ y d ^ A ^ ^ A ^ J . ^ ) %-Q 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS $ f? y. *& 
NET MONTHLY INCOME (Attach WTD 
pay stub and pnor year W-2/tax return) 7a cs~xj 
4 DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Purpose In whose Monthly 
Creditor's Name of debt name Balance Paymeni 
&?•> 
->&>& / j^yi^i^^-
& 
J-U3JX- 2£> , O f 
^niod/rd>Jp /H-'JJ< JirOL 
0 
TOTAL 
-2-
>U$045 
PROPERTY 
(a) Real estate (if more than one parcel of real estate, attach sheet with 
identical information) 
Address _ 
Date of acquisition. 
Original cost $ 
Mortgage balance $_ 
Mortgage holder 
Monthly payment $_ 
Other liens $ 
Lienholder 
Monthly payment $_ 
Current value $ 
Basis of valuation 
A/A 
Balance 
(b) Vehicles (Year, make & model) 
<3AAft <iG 9ooJ 
Value 
%^8^ 
i 
owed 
$ 3$<3<y 
(c) Cash and deposit accounts (banks, savmgs & 
loans, credit unions-savings and checking) 
Name of 
institution ^ Account No. 
Current 
balance 
\% 
-3-
'UH048 
(d) Securities, stocks, bonds, money 
market funds (other) 
Name of 
institution Account No 
Current 
value 
S 
'e) Busmess interests 
Name of 
busmess 
j^^/gkS?^ jj&> 
Shares 
Current 
value 
u 
(f) Other assets (include value or equity) 
PROFIT SHARING OR RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS sO^]) 
(If more than two accounts, attach sheet with identical information) 
Name of company/plan name 
Plan representative 
Address . 
Current value 
-4-
'U 
Name of company^ 
Plan representative,. 
Address 
Current value 
LIFE INSURANCE 
Policy ' Face 
Name of Company No Amount Cash Value (if any) 
1 — 4 > 
MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) $ tTpb€rj fS 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property msnrance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities' 
Electricity 
Natural gas 
Water 
Sewer 
Garbage 
Telephone 
Laundry and dry cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical 
Dental 
*y*A 
6>4° 
s&& 
£&• 
Xo • 
/ > -
%^> 
£o* 
^ -
" JS 
cT& 
<=*Z3 
> <*r> 
, <£><2» 
& O 
& & 
&> 
<=fe> 
<=£> 
/to?- ^ AUOt 
dJ? • ^ 
vJ r 
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive 
liability, disability: excluding deductions 
from wages m item 2 above) 
Child care 
Payment of child support or alimony 
from pnor marriage 
School 
Entertainment 
Gifts 
Donations 
Travel 
Auto expense 
Auto payments 
Installment payments (from item 4 above, 
not including above) 
Other expenses (specify) 
.^r~ 
V9M 
3 ^ 7 yJfag&Ja*^ 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES 
J> 
- 3XZ-
.DO " 
> 
Or 
S^C?' 
/%£< 
$r /72 
a s 
o£> 
<sz> 
z^ 
STATE OF UTAH) 
County of Salt Lake) ss. 
I swear under penalty of perjury that all of tjie information contained herein is 
true and correct. ^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
• j i ^ ^ ^ U ^ ^ ' 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
G-L-0 " 
(Rev. 3/01) 
Notary Public 
GLORIA NEMELKA 
6806S1300 E 
Salt Lake City, UT S4121 
My Oommis&lon Expires 
June 06,2009 
State of Utah 
6-
uj-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 
postage prepaid to; 
By the undersigned: 
,20 , a true and correct copy of 
in case # was mailed, 
LOANOLOGY, LLi 
GENERAL ACCOUNT 
488 E 6400S#125 
MURRAY, UT 84107-7589 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, H.i 
Sail Lake Dry Utah B4101 
4/20/2006 
PAY TO THE ADVICE OF DEPOSIT - NON-NEGOTIABLE 
ORDER OF $ 
* * * * • * * • * * * • * • * • * * * • • * • • * • * * * * * • * • * 
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ ^ 
MEMO: 
DOLLARS 
Tina Simmons Pugh 
Pay Period: 04/01/2006 - 04/15/2006 Direct Deposit NON-NEGOTIABLE 
ii-0 S L E =3*««* i: IE 1*00 15 i .5 i : & 1 7 1 * 1 1 0 &ii «• 
LOANOLOGY, LLC 
GENERAL ACCOUNT 
Employee 
21294 
Status (Fed/State) Allowances/Extra 
Tina Simmons Pugh, 8346 Willow Creek Drive, Sandy, UT 84093 
Earnings and Hours Qty Rate Current YTD Amount 
Salary 
Hourly Rate 
Deductions From Gross 
455.00 
455 00 
Health Insurance Emp 
Taxes 
-29 40 
Social Security Employee 
Medicare Employee 
Federal Withholding 
UT - Withholding 
Adjustments to Net Pay 
Dental Select 
Child Support Garnishment 
Net Pay 
-207 42 
185 62 
Married using Single Rate/Married 
Pay Period 04/01/2006-04/15/2006 
Fed-5/0/UT-5/0 
Pay Date 04/20/2006 
1,820 00 Direct Deposit 
5,763 75 Checking - *****5639 
Amount 
185 62 
7,583 75 
Current YTD Amount 
-235.20 
Current YTD Amount 
-26 39 
-6 17 
-32 56 
Current 
-16.28 
-191 14 
-455 61 
-106.55 
-307 00 
-208 46 
-1,077 62 
YTD Amount 
-130.24 
-573 42 
-703.66 
5,567.27 
LOANOLOGY, LLC , 488 E 6400 S , Ste #125, Murray, UT 84107 (801) 506-2250 
- H i ' . f , 5 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case 
on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references, (a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and 
with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references 
to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court, or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the 
appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall 
be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature 
of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported 
by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in 
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which 
the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state 
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall 
contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not 
available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of 
the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, 
and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to 
the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply 
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. 
The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs 
(a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and 
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations 
as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or 
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,1 "the taxpayer," 
etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of 
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume 
as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the 
transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not 
exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages 
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) 
of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth 
the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties 
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file 
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in 
combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues 
raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and 
present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and 
Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to 
the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall 
reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court 
for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds 
the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be 
briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause.for 
granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is 
due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by a 
copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is 
due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy 
of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any 
responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without 
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief 
will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving 
more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes 
of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant 
or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may 
similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities 
come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral 
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine 
copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the 
letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter 
must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
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compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts 
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer 
v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial 
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). 
See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell 
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 
738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the 
applicable standard of review and citation of supporting authority. 
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SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] Released for 
Publication September 5,2006. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Fourth District, Heber Dep't. The 
Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr. No. 000500087. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee mine company 
filed a complaint seeking partition of certain property. As 
part of the partition process, the Fourth District, Heber 
Department, Utah, appointed three referees to investigate 
the issues relevant to the partition and to produce a re-
port. The trial court partitioned the property located in 
two counties, and it entered an accompanying award of 
owelty. Appellant tenant-in-common challenged the par-
tition. 
OVERVIEW: The mine company sought annexation of 
1340 acres of land for development purposes. The mine 
company and the tenant-in-common owned approxi-
mately 342 acres of property. The partition property was 
comprised of certain patented mining claims. The tenant-
in-common contended the mine company waived its 
right to partition, and it was therefore error for the trial 
court to order the partition. Alternatively, the tenant-in-
common argued that the trial court erred in its calculation 
of the owelty award and its refusal to order an account-
ing. The appellate court determined that the accounting 
issue was duplicative of the owelty claim; therefore, it 
focused on the partition issue. The appellate court re-
jected the tenant-in-common's challenge to the trial 
court's ruling because the tenant-in-common had failed to 
marshal the evidence as required by Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). What was presented to the appellate court was 
merely another argument of the case presented in the trial 
court. As a result, the appellate court assumed that the 
evidence supported the factual findings underlying the 
ruling. 
OUTCOME: The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court's judgment. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Clearly Erroneous Review 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De 
Novo Review 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Fact & Law Issues 
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership 
> Partition Actions 
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[HN1 ] Whether a party has effectuated a waiver of parti-
tion is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether a trial 
court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a 
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the 
actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual 
in nature and should be reviewed as factual determina-
tions. An appellate court grants broadened discretion to a 
trial court's findings when reviewing questions of waiver. 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, 
Demurrers, & Objections > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, 
Demurrers, & Objections > Waiver &. Preservation 
[HN2] A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an ex-
isting right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. Questions of 
waiver often hinge on the critical third element of intent. 
An appellate court has explained that the intent to relin-
quish a right must be distinct and that fact-finders should 
look at the totality of the circumstances in discerning 
intent. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Briefs 
[HN3] See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, 
Demurrers, & Objections > Waiver & Preservation 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Briefs 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Fact & Law Issues 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Substantial Evidence > Sufficiency of Evidence 
[HN4] To pass the threshold of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), 
parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to 
a lower court. That waiver is a mixed question of law 
and fact does not relieve a party of this important task. 
Even where appellants purport to challenge only the le-
gal ruling, if a determination of the correctness of a 
court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-
sensitive, parties also have a duty to marshal the evi-
dence. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Briefs 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Weight & Suf-
ficiency 
[HNS] Parties are required to temporarily remove their 
own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's posi-
tion; they must play the devil's advocate. In so doing, 
parties must present the evidence in a light most favor-
able to a trial court and not attempt to construe the evi-
dence in a light favorable to their case. In sum, to prop-
erly marshal the evidence, a challenging party must 
demonstrate how a court found the facts from the evi-
dence and then explain why those findings contradict the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Briefs 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
General Overview 
[HN6] An appellate court has repeatedly warned of the 
grim consequences parties face when ihey fail to fulfill 
the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to perform 
this critical task, an appellate court car rely on that fail-
ure to affirm the lower court's findings of fact. 
Civil Procedure > Equity > Relief 
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership 
> Partition Actions 
[HN7] The owelty remedy, though enabled by statute, 
Utah Code Ann § 78-39-41 (2002), is an equitable form 
of relief. The statute itself recognizes the equitable nature 
of owelty: it empowers courts to make compensatory 
adjustment among the parties according to the principles 
of equity. This is consistent with the characterization of 
partition, which an appellate court has held to be an eq-
uitable action, in part because the fundamental objective 
in a partition action is to divide the property so as to be 
fair and equitable and confer no unfair advantage on any 
of the co-tenants. 
Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Clearly Erroneous Review 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De 
Novo Review 
[HNS] In equity cases, an appellate court reviews a trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness. An appellate 
court grants considerable deference to a trial court's fac-
tual findings and will not reverse those findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. 
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > Judges > Discre-
tion 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Bench Trials 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Abuse of Discretion 
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership 
> Partition Actions 
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[HN9] The equitable distribution of property involves 
more than factual findings and legal conclusions: it re-
quires trial courts to balance the relative significance of 
the facts and applicable law in order to achieve a fair and 
equitable result. This balancing requires the exercise of 
discretion. In partition actions, trial courts are specifi-
cally accorded broad discretion in fashioning an appro-
priate decree. An appellate court will affirm a trial court's 
exercise of that broad discretion unless it was abused. 
Civil Procedure > Equity > Relief 
Civil Procedure > Remedies > General Overview 
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership 
> General Overview 
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership 
> Partition Actions 
[HN10] Owelty is a remedy sometimes awarded in con-
junction with a partition order. When a partition cannot 
be made without great prejudice to a cotenant, a trial 
court, by statute, is permitted to order a sale of the prop-
erty. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-1 (2002). Owelty is an 
equitable alternative to this often undesirable result. Un-
der Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41, a court can go forward 
with the partition and award owelty to a prejudiced party 
in order to compensate for any inequality suffered by that 
party. In the past, an appellate court has expressed a 
preference that trial courts award owelty rather than 
forcing a sale. An appellate court reemphasizes this pref-
erence: a public sale should be a last resort, especially in 
cases where both parties desire to retain an interest in the 
property to be partitioned. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Fact & Law Issues 
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership 
> Partition Actions 
[HN11] Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41, a trial 
court is required to determine whether a partition could 
be made equally among the parties without prejudice to 
the rights and interests of another party. This is clearly a 
question of fact. 
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > Judges > Discre-
tion 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Briefs 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Abuse of Discretion 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Fact & Law Issues 
[HN12] When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive use 
of its discretionary powers, they must successfully chal-
lenge the factual findings upon which a trial court's deci-
sion depended. This requires that parties marshal the 
evidence. Parties who ask an appellate court to consider 
fact-sensitive questions—including those questions re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion standard-have a 
duty to marshal all the evidence that formed the basis for 
a trial court's ruling. 
COUNSEL: Laura S. Scott, Michael P. Petrogeorge, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Wendy A. Faber, Salt Lake City, for defendant Deer 
Valley Resort. 
Casey K. McGarvey, Salt Lake City, for defendant New-
park Resources. 
JUDGES: PARRISR Justice. Chief Justice Durham, 
Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant and 
Judge Quinn concur in Justice Parrish's opinion. Having 
disqualified himself, Justice Nehring does not participate 
herein; District Court Judge Anthony B. Quinn sat. 
OPINION BY: PARRISH 
OPINION 
[**1202] PARRISH, Justice: 
[*P1] This case stems from the application of a 
much-favored property right: a cotenant's right to parti-
tion. Partition is intended to broker peace between feud-
ing cotenants and promote the productive use of prop-
erty. The scarcity of relevant case law is perhaps a re-
flection of the effectiveness and wisdom of the remedy. 
Nevertheless, a judicial partition [**1203] can some-
times breed further contention and dissatisfaction. 
[***2] This is one such case. 
[*P2] Appellants Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds 
(collectively, "Mayflower") challenge the trial court's 
partition of certain property located in Summit and Wa-
satch Counties and an accompanying award of owelty. 
Mayflower contends that appellee United Park City 
Mines Company ("United Park") waived its right to par-
tition and that it was therefore error for the trial court to 
order the partition. Alternatively, Mayflower argues that 
the trial court erred in its calculation of the owelty award 
and its refusal to order an accounting. 
[*P3] We reject Mayflower's challenge to the trial 
court's ruling because Mayflower has failed to marshal 
the evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, we assume 
iu :n^» 
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that the evidence supports the factual findings underlying 
the ruling. We therefore affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
I. FACTUAL HISTORY 
A. The Properties 
[*P4] United Park and Mayflower own approxi-
mately 342 acres of property (the "Partition Property") as 
tenants in common. The Partition Property is comprised 
of certain patented mining claims located in the Uintah 
[***3] Mining District. Approximately 216 acres of the 
Partition Property lie in Summit County; the remaining 
acres are located in Wasatch County. The Partition Prop-
erty is located in an area commonly known as "Upper 
Mountain." 
[*P5] Additionally, United Park and Mayflower 
each separately own nearby properties. United Park owns 
approximately 1400 acres of property located in Summit 
County (the "United Park Property"). Part of the United 
Park Property is an 84-acre parcel termed "Mountain 
Village," which is located in an area commonly known 
as "Lower Mountain." Another part of the United Park 
Property is a portion of the "Northside Neighborhood," a 
planned 63-acre development in Upper Mountain. United 
Park and Deer Valley Resort Company ("Deer Valley") 
are the two main Northside Neighborhood property own-
ers; three others also own interests in the Northside 
Neighborhood, including Mayflower. Mayflower solely 
owns approximately 50 to 60 acres of Summit County 
property (the "Mayflower Property"). 
B. The Annexation and Development Agreement 
[*P6] United Park has long sought to develop the 
United Park Property. But Summit County zoning regu-
lations, which permitted only one unit [***4] of devel-
opment per 40 acres, prevented large-scale development. 
In 1994, United Park petitioned Park City for annexation 
of approximately 1340 acres of land located in Summit 
County, seeking a regulatory framework more conducive 
to its development goals. Thus began a long and difficult 
negotiation process that ultimately culminated in United 
Park's partition petition. 
[*P7] Park City allegedly responded to United 
Park's 1994 petition by insisting on two conditions to 
annexation: (1) that the annexation extend to the Summit 
County line and cover property owned by several differ-
ent owners, including the United Park Property, the May-
flower Property, and the portion of the Partition Property 
lying within Summit County (collectively, the "Flagstaff 
Development"); and (2) that the Flagstaff Development 
be subject to a master development agreement (the "De-
velopment Agreement") regulating its use and develop-
ment. United Park continued negotiating with Park City 
for over four years. United Park and Park City particu-
larly struggled over how much development density to 
allocate to the Mountain Village and Northside Neigh-
borhood developments. None of the other property own-
ers ever participated [***5] in the negotiation process, 
nor did they bear the associated expenses. 
[*P8] In 1997, the Park City planning commission 
approved United Park's proposal, which called for devel-
opment in both the Upper Mountain and Lower Moun-
tain areas. The city council, however., rejected the pro-
posal and passed a resolution restricting development to 
Lower Mountain. Frustrated, [**1204] United Park 
initiated parallel negotiations with Summit County for a 
deal that would amend that County's restrictive zoning 
regulations. Park City resumed negotiations with United 
Park shortly thereafter, and in 1998, the city council 
passed a resolution allowing for development on Upper 
Mountain. The annexation and the Development Agree-
ment were both finalized on June 24, 1999. 
[*P9] The Development Agreement permits 470 
residences, 16 single-family lots, and commercial devel-
opment in Mountain Village. The Development Agree-
ment also allows for the development of up to 38 single-
family lots in the Northside Neighborhood. Under the 
Development Agreement, United Park and Deer Valley 
are collectively entitled to 30 lots in the Northside 
Neighborhood. The Development Agreement also 
authorizes 8 additional Northside Neighborhood [***6] 
lots (the "Conditional Lots"), but only in the event that 
the other three property owners, including Mayflower, 
elect to join in the Development Agreement. According 
to the Development Agreement, all development is to 
take place within discrete "development pods"; the ma-
jority of the Flagstaff Development—approximately 1500 
acres-is zoned as "recreational open space." 
[*P10] Approximately 3.5 acres of the Partition 
Property (the "Adjacent Property") are located adjacent 
to both the proposed subdivision within the Northside 
Neighborhood and the Mayflower Property. The May-
flower Property is also located adjacent to the proposed 
subdivision within the Northside Neighborhood. The 
portion of the Partition Property located in Wasatch 
County was not annexed and is not subject to the Devel-
opment Agreement. 
[*P11] United Park made significant concessions 
as part of the Development Agreement. In exchange for 
enhanced development rights in the United Park Property 
and the Northside Neighborhood, United Park agreed not 
to develop (1) an approximately 650-acre parcel in 
Summit County commonly known as "Richardson Flats"; 
(2) an approximately 90-acre parcel located at the top of 
M J M 
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Iron [***7] Mountain; and (3) a parcel commonly 
known as "Prospect Ridge." United Park also agreed to 
"offer to dedicate to the City a conservation easement[] 
or deed" in order to preserve several parking lots located 
near City Hall. United Park was also forced to "ratchet 
down its proposed density" for its development of an 
approximately 1500-acre parcel in Wasatch County 
commonly known as "Bonanza Flats." Additionally, 
United Park committed to operating private shuttle serv-
ices within Mountain Village, as well as undertaking 
multi-million dollar road construction and renovation 
projects. As part of the Development Agreement, Park 
City acquired a conservation easement over 1,000-plus 
acres of property owned solely by United Park. United 
Park also agreed to either construct a gondola between 
the Flagstaff Mountain Resort and old town Park City or, 
if Park City demanded, pay one million dollars to Park 
City. 
C. The United Park-Mayflower Relationship 
[*P12] Throughout its negotiations with Park City, 
United Park attempted to get Mayflower and the other 
Flagstaff Development property owners to participate in 
a joint venture. These efforts ultimately were unsuccess-
ful. On February 25, 1997, Hank [***8] Rothwell, the 
president of United Park, faxed a letter (the "1997 Let-
ter") to Mayflower stating, "United Park or its represen-
tatives, will not annex [Mayflower's] property or accept a 
density approval for [Mayflower's] property without 
[Mayflower's] notification and permission." The 1997 
Letter was purportedly "reconfirmed" on March 20, 
1997. Discussions between United Park and Mayflower 
continued, and on September 3, 1998, Mayflower ad-
vised Park City in writing that it objected to the terms of 
the annexation. United Park grew increasingly frustrated 
by Mayflower's refusal to participate in any kind of joint 
venture, and on January 21, 1999, Rothwell sent a letter 
to Mayflower advising that United Park would "delete 
Mayflower property from [the] Master Planning effort." 
[*P13] The annexation was finalized on June 24, 
1999, pursuant to Park City Ordinance No. 99-30. Al-
though unilateral, the annexation petition was proper 
under Utah Code section J 0-2-403(2) (b) (1999), which 
requires [**1205] that a petition be signed by the owner 
or owners of "a majority of the private land area within 
the area proposed for annexation" that is "equal in value 
to at least 1/3 of the value of all private [***9] real 
property within the area proposed for annexation." Be-
cause United Park was the undisputed majority property 
owner, its petition met these requirements. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
[*P14] In February 2000, United Park filed a com-
plaint seeking partition of the Partition Property. As part 
of the partition process, the trial court appointed three 
referees to investigate the issues relevant to the partition 
and to produce a report recommending how the Partition 
Property should be divided. Each party chose one refe-
ree; those two referees in turn selected a third neutral 
referee. 
[*P15] Over the course of several months, the refe-
rees reviewed the history of the annexation process and 
the resulting Development Agreement. The referees first 
focused their efforts on deciding how best to physically 
divide the Partition Property; they then investigated 
Mayflower's claims that the Development Agreement 
had resulted in a transfer of development density from 
the Partition Property and the Mayflower Property to 
Mountain Village and the Northside Neighborhood. The 
referees submitted their reports in April 2001. The neu-
tral referee and the United Park referee signed the ma-
jority conclusions [***10] and recommendations (the 
"Majority Report"), while the Mayflower referee sub-
mitted a separate, dissenting report (the "Minority Re-
port"). 
[*P16] The Majority Report recommended that the 
Partition Property be divided so that United Park and 
Mayflower each receive approximately 108 acres in 
Summit County and roughly 63 acres in Wasatch 
County. Additionally, the Majority Report proposed that 
Mayflower be granted the Adjacent Property as part of 
its 108-acre Summit County allotment. The Majority 
Report further recommended that the trial court award 
Mayflower 3 or 4 of the Conditional Lots. According to 
the Majority Report, this award would compensate May-
flower for density that was "probably relocated from the 
[Partition Property and the Mayflower Property] and 
clustered into the Northside Neighborhood." In making 
this recommendation, the authors of the Majority Report 
stated that they were "convinced that the density in the 
Flagstaff Development gained from the [Partition Prop-
erty] and from [the Mayflower Property] is limited to 
Mayflower's fair portion of the [Conditional Lots] in the 
Northside Neighborhood." 
[*P17] The Minority Report did not dispute the 
Majority [***11] Report's proposed physical partition of 
the Partition Property. It disagreed with the Majority 
Report, however, as to how many of the Conditional Lots 
Mayflower should be awarded. The Minority Report 
found that density may have been transferred to Moun-
tain Village from the Partition Property. According to the 
Minority Report's calculations, Mayflower was possibly 
entitled to a total of 7.85 to 8.1 lots. 
[*P18] In March 2002, Mayflower amended its an-
swer in the partition lawsuit to allege that United Park, 
through the 1997 Letter, had waived its right to partition 
the Partition Property. Both parties filed unsuccessful 
*u .nfin 
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summary judgment motions in late 2002. In May 2004, 
the court held a bench trial and subsequently issued a 
ruling adopting the recommendations of the Majority 
Report. The trial court issued amended findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order in October 2004, and 
Mayflower timely appealed. This court initially trans-
ferred the appeal to the court of appeals but subsequently 
vacated the transfer order and recalled the case. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(2002). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P19] Our holding in this case is but the [***12] 
latest in a series of warning signs we must occasionally 
post for unsuspecting or overly clever parties. The fol-
lowing analysis should serve as frank, severe instruction 
for those parties who ask us to decide fact-dependent 
questions under the guise that they present only issues of 
law. 
[*P20] While Mayflower purports to raise a multi-
tude of issues in its briefs, the substance [**1206] of 
this case can actually be distilled into two discrete ques-
tions: (1) whether the trial court erred in determining that 
United Park did not waive its right to partition; and (2) 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning 
the owelty award. Mayflower also requests an account-
ing. Because we conclude that Mayflower's claim for an 
accounting is duplicative of its request for an additional 
owelty award, we refuse to consider that claim. We 
therefore focus on the questions of waiver and owelty 
and discuss each in turn. 
I. WAIVER 
[*P21] [HN1] Whether a party has effectuated a 
waiver is a mixed question of law and fact. Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P 23, 100 P.3d 1177; see also 
[***13] US.Realty 86 Assocs. v. Sea lnv., Ltd, 2002 
UT 14, P 11,40 P. 3d 586. As we explained in Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, P 16, 982 P.2d 572, "[W]hether 
the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver 
presents a legal question which is reviewed for correct-
ness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting 
waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as 
factual determinations." Accordingly, we "grant broad-
ened discretion to the trial court's findings" when re-
viewing questions of waiver. Chen, 2004 UT 82, P 23, 
100P.3dll77. 
[*P22] We have repeatedly applied the rule clari-
fied in Soterfs, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993), when evaluating 
questions of waiver. [HN2] "A waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, 
there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish 
it." Id (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re 
Flake, 2003 UT 17, P 30, 71 P. 3d 589. Questions of 
waiver often hinge on the critical third element of intent. 
We have explained that the intent to relinquish a right 
must be [***14] distinct and that fact-finders should 
ulook[] at the totality of the circumstances" in discerning 
intent. Id. 
[*P23] Mayflower argues that United Park waived 
its right to seek a partition of the property. And there is 
no dispute that the first two elements of waiver were 
satisfied here: United Park had the right to a partition and 
was aware of that right. Accordingly, the existence of a 
waiver turns on the question of intent. On this point, the 
trial court found that "United Park hafd] not waived its 
right to partition[;] [t]he [1997 Letter] . . . did not evi-
dence an intent by United Park to waive its right to parti-
tion." Because the issue of intent is determinative here, 
Mayflower must successfully challenge this factual 
finding if we are to reverse the trial court's ruling. This 
requires that Mayflower marshal all the evidence sup-
porting that finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Because 
Mayflower has failed to do so, we assume that the evi-
dence supports the finding and consequently affirm. 
[*P24] Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure requires [HN3] "[a] party challenging a 
fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the [***15] challenged finding." See also State 
v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, P 17, 124 P.3d 235; Wilson Sup-
ply, Inc. v Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 21, 54 
P.3d 1177. [HN4] To pass this threshold, parties pro-
testing findings of fact must "marshal all the evidence in 
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evi-
dence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, P 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
[*P25] That waiver is a mixed question of law and 
fact does not relieve Mayflower of this important task. 
"Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the 
legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness 
of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely 
fact-sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty to mar-
shal the evidence." Chen, 2004 UT 82, P 20, 100 P.3d 
1177. Mayflower cannot dodge this duty by attempting 
to frame the issues as legal ones. Because the question of 
waiver is so dependent on factual findings, Mayflower 
must marshal the evidence if it seeks to challenge the 
trial court's determination of that question. 
[***16] [**1207] [*P26] Mayflower has not 
done so. It ostensibly makes an effort to marshal the evi-
dence on pages 21-22 of its brief: "It marshals the evi-
dence . . . to present the [1997 Letter] and testimony [of 
one witness]." But contrary to Mayflower's wistful as-
<iP061 
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sertion, presenting evidence supporting the challenged 
conclusion does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. 
Parties cannot discharge their duty by "simply 
providing] an exhaustive review of all evidence pre-
sented at trial." Chen, 2004 UT82, P 77, 100 P 3d 1177. 
Rather, [HN5] parties are required to 
"temporarily remove [their] own preju-
dices and fully embrace the adversary's 
position"; [they] must play the "devil's 
advocate." In so doing, appellants must 
present the evidence in a light most favor-
able to the trial court and not attempt to 
construe the evidence in a light favorable 
to their case . . . . In sum, to properly mar-
shal the evidence the challenging party 
must demonstrate how the court found the 
facts from the evidence and then explain 
why those findings contradict the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
[***17] Id. P 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 
108, P 19, 57 P.3d 1093) (citations omitted). What May-
flower has done instead is "merely re-argue the factual 
case . . . presented in the trial court," id. P 77, leaving 
United Park and this court to bear the expense and time 
of performing the critical task of marshaling the evi-
dence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable. See 
id 
[*P27] [HN6] We repeatedly have warned of the 
grim consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill 
the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to perform 
this critical task, we can rely on that failure to affirm the 
lower court's findings of fact. Id. P 80] see also Clark, 
2005 UT 75, P 17, 124 P3d 235. We therefore affirm the 
trial court's factual findings, including its determination 
that United Park did not intend to waive its right to parti-
tion. Because we accept that finding of fact, we must 
also affirm the trial court's conclusion that United Park 
did not waive its right to partition. 
II. OWELTY 
[*P28] Because this court has rarely reviewed ow-
elty awards, we understand both parties' confusion as to 
the applicable standard of review. We therefore pause to 
clarify [***18] the correct standard. [HN7] The owelty 
remedy, though enabled by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
7839-41 (2002), is an equitable form of relief. The stat-
ute itself recognizes the equitable nature of owelty: it 
empowers courts "to make compensator}' adjustment 
among the parties according to the principles of equity'' 
Id. (emphasis added). This is consistent with our charac-
terization of partition, which we have held to be "an eq-
uitable action," in part because "[t]he fundamental ob-
jective in a partition action is to divide the property so as 
to be fair and equitable and confer no unfair advantage 
on any of the co-tenants." Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694 
P.2d595, 596 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). We there-
fore review awards of owelty as we do other forms of 
equitable relief 
[*P29] [HN8] In equity cases, we review the trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness. RHN Corp. v. 
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, P 35, 96 P.3d 935. We grant con-
siderable deference to the trial court's factual findings 
and will not reverse those findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Id. 
[*P30] [HN9] The equitable distribution of prop-
erty, however, involves more than factual findings and 
legal conclusions: [***19] it requires trial courts to 
"balance[] the relative significance of the facts and appli-
cable law in order to achieve a fair and equitable result. 
This balancing requires the exercise of discretion." Par-
duhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, P 23, 112 P.3d 495. In 
partition actions, trial courts are specifically "accorded 
broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate decree." 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1982). We 
will affirm a trial court's exercise of that broad discretion 
unless it was abused. Id. 
[*P31] [HN10] Owelty is a remedy sometimes 
awarded in conjunction with a partition order. When a 
partition cannot be made without "great prejudice" to a 
cotenant, the trial court, by statute, is permitted to order a 
sale of the property. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-1 (2002). 
Owelty is an equitable alternative to this often undesir-
able result. Under Utah Code section 78-39-41, 
[**1208] a court can go forward with the partition and 
award owelty to a prejudiced party in order to compen-
sate for any inequality suffered by that party. In the past, 
this court has expressed a preference that trial courts 
award owelty rather than forcing a sale. See [***20] 
Clawson v. Silver, 2001 UT 42, PP 11, 12, 26 P3d 209. 
We reemphasize this preference: "a public sale should be 
a last resort," especially in cases where "both [parties] 
desire to retain an interest" in the property to be parti-
tioned. Id P 12. 
[*P32] Mayflower does not contest the trial court's 
actual physical division of the Partition Property. Rather, 
it challenges the owelty award, contending that the 4 
Conditional Lots awarded by the trial court do not suffi-
ciently compensate it for the prejudicial impact of the 
partition. Because Mayflower has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the owelty award, however, we can-
not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. 
[*P33] The trial court undertook an intensive fac-
tual inquiry in determining the owelty award. [HN11] 
Pursuant to section 78-39-41, the trial court was required 
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to determine whether the partition could be made 
"equally among the parties . . . without prejudice to the 
rights and interests of Mayflower. This was clearly a 
question of fact See [***21] Clawson, 2001 UT 42, P 
JO, 26 P.3d 209 ("Whether . . . a partition can be made 
without great prejudice to the owners is a question of 
fact." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
[*P34] The partition order entered by the trial court 
included the award of owelty in the form of the 4 Condi-
tional Lots that had been recommended by the Majority 
Report, thus reflecting the trial court's conclusion that an 
equal partition could not be achieved absent an award of 
some additional compensation to Mayflower. In reaching 
this conclusion, the trial court reviewed the voluminous 
record, which includes witness testimony, transcripts of 
city meetings, and the Majority and Minority Reports, 
and concluded that Mayflower had failed to "present any 
evidence that the physical division of the Partition Prop-
erty recommended by the [majority] referees is not fair 
or equitable." The trial court then had to "adjudge com-
pensation" that would remedy any "inequality" resulting 
from the partition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-41. This task 
again required that the trial court survey the record and 
consider issues of fact. 
[*P35] First, the trial court had to determine the 
extent of the inequality to be [***22] remedied by the 
owelty award. The court specifically focused on whether 
any density had been transferred from the Partition Prop-
erty or the Mayflower Property to Mountain Village or 
the Northside Neighborhood. While the trial court appar-
ently agreed with the Majority Report's conclusion that 
some density was "probably" transferred "from the [Par-
tition Property and the Mayflower Property] and clus-
tered into the Northside Neighborhood," it otherwise 
found that "no evidence was produced as a basis for 
[Mayflower's] claims for relief." Thus, like the drafters 
of the Majority Report, it was "convinced that the density 
in the Flagstaff Development gained from the [Partition 
Property] and from [the Mayflower Property] [was] lim-
ited to Mayflower's fair portion of the [Conditional Lots] 
in the Northside Neighborhood." 
[*P36] In addition to considering evidence con-
cerning the alleged density transfers, the trial court had 
to consider the amount of compensation necessary to 
achieve a fair and equitable partition. This again required 
that the trial court consider the evidence presented, in-
cluding the recommendations and calculations in the 
Majority and Minority Reports. The trial [***23] court 
ultimately decided that it would be appropriate to award 
Mayflower 4 of the Conditional Lots in order to offset 
the inequality produced by the probable transfer of den-
sity to the Northside Neighborhood. 
[*P37] This examination of the issues of prejudice, 
inequality, and compensation undergirded the trial court's 
eventual exercise of its discretionary powers in fashion-
ing the owelty award. [HN12] When parties appeal a 
court's fact-sensitive use of its discretionary powers, they 
"must successfully challenge the factual findings upon 
which the trial court's decision . . . depended." Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, nA4, 100 P.3d 1177. This requires 
that parties marshal [**1209] the evidence. As we have 
previously explained, parties who ask this court to con-
sider fact-sensitive questions—including those questions 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard—have a 
duty to marshal all the evidence that formed the basis for 
the trial court's ruling. See id. (holding that parties had a 
duty to marshal the evidence when challenging the ap-
pointment of an interim CEO. a question reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard). 
[*P38] We reaffirm the deliberate, clear instruction 
found [***24] in our prior decisions regarding the mar-
shaling obligation and emphasize that the labels given 
particular issues by courts or counsel are not determina-
tive. Rather, the critical element triggering the duty to 
marshal is factual inquiry. Parties seeking appellate re-
view must marshal the evidence on those questions that 
require substantive factual inquiry, regardless of whether 
those questions are reviewed for clear error or abuse of 
discretion. Otherwise, this court will not question a lower 
court's factual analysis and will instead assume that the 
evidence supports the challenged findings. 
[*P39] In challenging the owelty award, May-
flower had a duty to marshal all of the evidence sup-
porting the award, including evidence relevant to the 
questions of inequality and appropriate compensation. 
Even if the challenged ruling did not specifically refer-
ence all such evidence, Mayflower was nevertheless re-
quired to present "every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [it] 
resists." Id. P 77. This enables the reviewing court to 
evaluate fact-centric arguments in the context of the en-
tire body of evidence. 
[***25] [*P40] Mayflower has shirked that re-
sponsibility here. It has neither corralled the evidence 
supporting the compensation calculation of the trial court 
nor reviewed the evidence relating to the alleged density 
transfers "in a light most favorable to the trial court." Id. 
P 78. Instead, Mayflower has cobbled together disjointed 
arguments and repeatedly highlighted and restated only 
that evidence favorable to its position. 
[*P41] Because Mayflower has not properly chal-
lenged the factual basis underlying the owelty award, we 
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. 
We therefore affirm the trial court's award of owelty. 
a\ . 
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III. ACCOUNTING 
[*P42] Finally, Mayflower argues that the trial 
court erred by not requiring United Park to account for 
profits it received as a result of the annexation. We de-
cline to analyze this claim on the ground that it is dupli-
cative of Mayflower's claim for owelty. Indeed, the ac-
counting claim hinges on the same familiar question of 
fact: whether the alleged transfers of density actually 
occurred. And the amount awarded under either remedy 
would be shaped by the same consideration: the benefits 
or profits received by United [***26] Park as a result of 
the alleged density transfers. 
[*P43] Furthermore, because the resolution of 
Mayflower's request for an accounting hinges on a ques-
tion of fact, Mayflower has a corresponding duty to mar-
shal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings on 
that question As explained above, Mayflower has failed 
to do so and therefore has not effectively demonstrated 
that the trial court erred in failing to order an accounting. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P44] Unless appellants marshal the evidence 
relevant to fact-dependent questions, they risk having 
their appeals rejected without consideration of those 
questions. Despite this frequently repeated counsel, par-
ties sometimes attempt a second bite at the factual apple 
without first fulfilling this well-established duty. This 
tactic may be particularly appealing when a party at-
tempts, as Mayflower has done here, to characterize the 
issues as issues of law that are not reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. The duty is not, however, 
contingent on labels and standards of review; it instead 
springs when an evaluation of the record is central to the 
task confronting the reviewing court. 
[*P45] While this duty may seem [***27] to place 
appellants in the disadvantageous position of advocating 
the arguments they seek to rebut, it may often have the 
unexpected benefit of bolstering the cogency of the ar-
guments they [**1210] actually advance. Additionally, 
and more importantly, fairness and judicial economy 
compel us to vigorously enforce the threshold marshaling 
requirement found in rule 24(a)(9). Because Mayflower 
has not met this threshold, we must assume that the evi-
dence supports the factual findings underlying the trial 
court's decision and therefore affirm. 
[*P46] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Jus-
tice Wilkins, Justice Durrant and Judge Quinn concur in 
Justice Parrish's opinion. 
[*P47] Having disqualified himself, Justice Ne-
hring does not participate herein; District Court Judge 
Anthony B. Quinn sat. 
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OPINION BY: WILKIMS 
OPINION 
[**1221] WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice: 
[*P1] In the American system of justice, the fair-
ness, impartiality, stability, and wisdom of our legal 
system depend in major part on the integrity of the men 
and women serving as judges. We expect those to whom 
we entrust our lives, fortunes, and honor to exemplify 
those virtues. Respect for the rule of law is necessary for 
a democracy to function and to flourish. As a conse-
quence, respect for the rule of law by those we select as 
judges is mandatory. 
[*P2] [HN1] In Utah, the responsibility of ensuring 
that only those capable of meeting this high standard 
reach, and stay on, the bench is shared. The governor 
appoints judges [***2] based upon the recommendation 
of a nonpartisan merit selection commission. The senate 
reviews these appointments and must confirm them be-
fore any judge takes the bench. Once state judges are 
appointed and confirmed, the voters periodically review 
their performance, ] retaining those who have demon-
strated adequate performance and, on rare occasions, 
removing those who have not. 
1 Retention elections for state judges occur 
during regular general elections on six-year cy-
cles for district, juvenile, and court of appeals 
judges, Utah Code Ann. § 20A~12-201(l)(b)(ii) 
(2003), and ten-year cycles for justices of the su-
preme court, id §20A-12-201(l)(b)(i). 
[*P3] In addition to retention elections, two other 
mechanisms are available to safeguard [**1222] against 
judicial misbehavior. First, pursuant to the Utah Consti-
tution, the legislature has the authority to seek removal 
by impeachment of any judge who commits "high 
crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office." Utah 
Const art [***3] VI, §§ 17-19. Second, for those and 
other violations of the law or of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, the state constitution empowers the Judicial 
Conduct Commission to investigate and recommend to 
the supreme court the discipline of sitting judges. Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 13. Upon that recommendation, the 
supreme court has the authority to discipline a state judge 
or justice, as warranted. 
[*P4] Finally, as a voluntary matter, a judge or jus-
tice may choose to retire or resign to avoid the likelihood 
of other sanctions under some circumstances. 
[*P5] The judge in this case, Ray Harding, Jr., 
chose the latter option. He resigned from his seat on the 
Fourth District Court while an impeachment resolution 
was pending in the legislature and a recommendation 
from the Judicial Conduct Commission to remove him 
from office was in transit to the supreme court. 
[*P6] We accepted the resignation of former judge 
Harding, barred him from judicial office, and referred to 
the Utah State Bar the question of what additional action 
was appropriate under these circumstances. We directed 
the Bar to inquire into the facts of Harding's situation and 
to make a recommendation to us as to [***4] what, if 
any, action was necessary with respect to his continuing 
privilege to practice law in Utah. The Bar investigated 
and submitted its recommendations. It presented the re-
sults of its investigation to a screening panel of the Eth-
ics and Disciplinary Committee, which is appointed by 
this court and part of the apparatus of lawyer discipline 
we have established. The screening panel recommended 
suspension and probation. However, the Office of Pro-
fessional Conduct recommended that we consider dis-
barment of former Judge Ray Harding, Jr., for acts com-
mitted while sitting as a district court judge that violated 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. We agree that dis-
barment is warranted in this case. 
FACTS 
[*P7] On July 13, 2002, police responded to a do-
mestic disturbance call at the home of Judge Ray Hard-
ing, Jr. There, the officers discovered cocaine, heroin, 
and drug paraphernalia. In addition, Harding tested posi-
tive for cocaine, opiates, and Valium. His wife informed 
the police that she had observed Harding smoking crack 
cocaine on a prior occasion and that Harding previously 
told her that he had been using crack and heroin since 
October 2001, while serving as a district [***5] court 
judge. Harding was arrested and charged with two counts 
of unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony. Subsequently, he pled guilty to two 
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counts of attempted possession or use of a controlled 
substance-a class A misdemeanor-and was sentenced to 
two one-year jail terms (with 120 days of actual incar-
ceration), fined $ 9250. ordered to perform 500 hours of 
community service, and placed on two years' probation, 
which included participation in individual therapy and 
recovery programs. 
[*P8] At the time charges were filed, Harding was 
actively serving as a judge in the Fourth District Court. 
He has been a member of the Bar since 1978 and was 
appointed to the bench in September 1995. Beginning on 
July 14, 2002, the day after his arrest, various news me-
dia accounts informed the public of Harding's drug use, 
including the allegation that he had presided over court 
proceedings while under the influence of controlled sub-
stances. In response, Harding steadfastly maintained his 
innocence and maligned his wife in the media by brand-
ing her a liar and a bad influence on their children. 
[*P9] On November 19, 2002, the Judicial Conduct 
Commission [***6] instituted formal proceedings 
against Harding, who, although suspended from his du-
ties and periodically incarcerated or in drug rehabilitation 
treatment, was still drawing his full judicial salary. Fol-
lowing a full disciplinary hearing [**1223] process, the 
Commission issued an order recommending removal in 
mid-February, 2003, which it then forwarded to us for 
our review and action. At approximately the same time, 
the Utah House of Representatives, in response to the 
public outcry over Harding's criminal conduct and con-
tinued status as a sitting district court judge, passed a 
resolution to impeach him, the first such resolution in 
Utah history. However, before the senate could vote on 
the resolution and before this court had received the 
Commission's recommendation, Harding resigned from 
the bench effective February 28, 2003. It was approxi-
mately one week later that Harding pled guilty to two 
counts of attempted possession or use of a controlled 
substance. 
[*P10] In an order dated March 25, 2003, this court 
acknowledged receipt of the Commission's recommen-
dation but noted that Harding's resignation had rendered 
the issue of removal moot. Nevertheless, we ordered that 
Harding "be permanently [***7] disqualified from 
serving in any judicial or quasi-judicial position in the 
State of Utah" and, in a separate document, referred the 
question of Harding's fitness to practice law to the Office 
of Professional Conduct, instructing it to "proceed with a 
disciplinary review under its ordinary rules, but with its 
conclusions and recommendations regarding [Harding's] 
license . . . to be submitted directly to this Court for final 
action." 
[*P11] Pursuant to our directive, the Office of Pro-
fessional Conduct conducted an investigation and pre-
sented its findings and recommendation at a formal 
hearing before a screening panel in January 2004. Hard-
ing, accompanied by counsel, appeared at the hearing, 
offered his own testimony and that of several witnesses, 
and presented arguments concerning the Office of Pro-
fessional Conduct's proposed sanction. The screening 
panel considered the matter as it would for any lawyer 
caught in the snare of drugs. It noted Harding's efforts at 
rehabilitation and recommended a six-month suspension 
from the practice of law as the appropriate sanction. The 
panel further recommended that the suspension be stayed 
and that Harding be placed on probation for five [***8] 
years, provided he submit to random drug testing and 
continued to participate in a substance abuse rehabilita-
tion program. The Office of Professional Conduct, to 
whom our instructions were directed, however, takes the 
position that Harding should be either suspended for two 
or three years or disbarred, based upon our constitutional 
authority to control the practice of law, and our prior 
actions suggesting that either the longer suspension or 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction in a case such as 
this. These recommendations now come before us for 
final disposition. Unlike other matters often handled 
here, lawyer discipline and judicial discipline come to us 
as matters of original jurisdiction, as opposed to being 
presented as an appeal. We review the recommendations 
in that light. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P12] [HN2] Under article eight, section four of 
the Utah Constitution, this court has plenary authority to 
discipline lawyers for their behavior as judges. See Utah 
Const, art VIII, § 4 ("The Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law, including . . . the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law."). In addi-
tion, Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline [***9] 
and Disability provides that "[a] [HN3] former judge 
who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as 
a lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the 
lawyer was a judge." Utah R. Lawyer Discipline & Dis-
ability 6(c). [HN4] In determining an appropriate sanc-
tion, this court is free to examine all relevant facts and 
circumstances and is under no obligation to defer to the 
conclusions of any other body. See In re Anderson, 2004 
UT 7, PP46-47, 82 P3d 1134. 
[*P13] As an initial matter, Harding argues that we 
lack jurisdiction over this proceeding. He contends, 
rather, that our "final order" of March 25, 2003, repre-
sents a [**1224] final determination under Rule 6(c) of 
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and that 
this court is therefore barred from imposing any penalty 
other than the already-mandated disqualification of 
Harding from future judicial office. In short, the crux of 
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Harding's argument is that our review of his fitness to 
practice law after we have permanently disqualified him 
from the bench subjects him to a form of double jeop-
ardy. We disagree. 
[*P14] Our disagreement is based on [***10] sev-
eral grounds. First, the source of our jurisdiction-article 
eight, section four of the Utah Constitution-gives us 
plenary authority to discipline lawyers for their behavior 
as judges. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4. Additionally, 
Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disabil-
ity provides that this court may sanction lawyers for mis-
conduct committed while on the bench, except in cases 
where "the misconduct was . . . the subject of a judicial 
disciplinary proceeding as to which there has been a final 
determination by the Supreme Court." Utah R. Lawyer 
Discipline & Disability 6(c). Harding fails to note that no 
disciplinary proceeding reached us for which any final 
order could have then issued. Our action in March 2003 
was prompted by his resignation, which included the 
pledge not to seek judicial office again. We simply took 
him at his word. The disciplinary proceedings, having 
stretched through a number of months in the Judicial 
Conduct Commission, were rendered moot, and never 
reached us for action, as a result of Harding's resignation. 
[*P15] Moreover, on the same day we accepted 
and memorialized Harding's resignation and pledge not 
to seek judicial office [***11] in the future, we also is-
sued an order to the Office of Professional Conduct, di-
recting it to proceed with a disciplinary review "under its 
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommen-
dations regarding Mr. Harding's license to practice law to 
be submitted directly to this Court for final action." 
Taken together, these simultaneous orders demonstrate 
that our disqualification of Harding from judicial office 
was not a "final determination" under Rule 6(c). Instead, 
these documents gave notice of our ongoing jurisdiction 
over the review of Harding's fitness to practice law 
within this state. Our jurisdiction over this matter is cer-
tain. 
[*P16] Regarding Harding's double jeopardy claim, 
we need only note that [HN5] there is no basis for a 
claim of double jeopardy protection in either judicial 
discipline or lawyer discipline matters. Both are matters 
of appointment, oath, and privilege. Neither is a matter 
of criminal sanction, of being "twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb" for the same offense. U.S. Const, amend V. 
Double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions 
for the same criminal offense, after acquittal, and not 
against successive judicial and lawyer discipline [***12] 
proceedings arising from the same misconduct by a sit-
ting judge. 
[*P17] Finally, we reject Harding's claim that his 
due process rights were denied him in the process of 
factual determination undertaken by the Bar at our direc-
tion. Harding asserts that he did not receive a full and 
fair hearing before the screening panel because he did 
not have the opportunity to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. He also argues that after the screening panel de-
termined there was probable cause that he violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Office of Professional 
Conduct should have filed an action in district court pur-
suant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, as opposed to a proceeding in this court. We 
disagree with both arguments. 
[*P18] Harding repeatedly relies upon an analogy 
to criminal process in making his arguments. However, 
as we have said before, [HN6] attorney discipline matters 
are civil in nature. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d207, 214 (Utah 
1997). Moreover, attorney discipline proceedings, being 
the exclusive province of this court, are conducted under 
the rules and directions we give. The Ethics and Disci-
plinary Committee screening panel [***13] handled the 
factual investigation of Harding's misconduct. They did 
so because we directed the [**1225] Bar, through its 
Office of Professional Conduct, to follow its usual pro-
cedure in conducting the factual investigation up to a 
point. 
[*P19] Usually, if our Ethics and Disciplinary 
Committee determines that a serious violation of the 
canons of lawyer behavior has occurred, the matter is 
directed to the district court for a hearing on that evi-
dence. The district court, in lawyer discipline matters, 
has only the jurisdiction or authority we delegate to it, 
and the decision of the district court, acting under a di-
rect delegation of our exclusive authority, is subject to 
review only by us. In Harding's case, knowing that we 
neither needed nor desired the participation of the district 
court, we directed the Bar to return the matter directly to 
us for resolution. Our primary purpose was to develop a 
factual record that included Harding's claims and de-
fenses, as well as the matters establishing the nature and 
extent of his misbehavior while a judge. 
[*P20] [HN7] The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, under which the proceedings were conducted, 
do not provide to the attorney who is [*** 14] the subject 
of the hearing the right to cross-examine witnesses. In 
fact, all questioning is usually done by the screening 
panel, and includes opportunity for the lawyer, his legal 
counsel, and the complaining party, to suggest areas of 
inquiry to the panel. The accused lawyer is given prior 
notice of the charges, notice of the hearing, a right to be 
present at the hearing, and to be represented by counsel 
at the hearing. The lawyer is guaranteed a right to appear 
and present testimony, offer witnesses on his own behalf, 
and present an oral argument with respect to the com-
plaint against him. The proceedings are recorded and 
preserved for review as necessary, and a written report of 
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he panel's findings and conclusions is given to the law-
yer. Utah R. Lawyer Discipline & Disability 10. 
[*P21] These measures are adequate, given the 
lature of lawyer discipline proceedings, to ensure due 
process to a lawyer accused of misconduct. Direct and 
cross-examination of the witnesses is not required in the 
quasi-administrative setting of the screening panel. As a 
result, we find no due process deficiencies in Harding's 
case. 
[*P22] Turning to the question of the appropriate 
punishment [***15] for Harding's misconduct, we hold 
that disbarment is necessary. As a preliminary matter, we 
emphasize that, [HN8] although they are extremely use-
fill guidelines and will be accorded deference in the vast 
majority of cases, this court is not restricted by the Rules 
of Professional Conduct in evaluating whether an attor-
ney should be disbarred. Rather, we examine all relevant 
facts and circumstances in attempting to determine what 
punishment, if any, is appropriate to deter similar con-
duct and to protect the public. In this case, we also con-
sider what action is necessary to restore any measure of 
lost public confidence in the system of justice caused by 
Harding's conduct. Here, there can be no question that 
Harding's behavior represented "conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice," 2 which was made 
all the more egregious because Harding occupied a posi-
tion on the district court bench. Upon accepting his ap-
pointment, Harding took a solemn oath to conduct him-
self in accordance with the highest standards of profes-
sional conduct, in furtherance of the public trust placed 
in him by the citizens of this state to properly administer 
justice. Rather than honoring this trust, however, 
[*** 16] Harding's subsequent behavior undermined it. 
2 Utah R. Professional Conduct 8.4(d). 
[*P23] Standing alone, Harding's possession and 
use of unlawful controlled substances might not be 
enough to warrant disbarment. However, the totality of 
the circumstances indicates that such a penalty is indeed 
warranted here. To begin, after being charged, Harding 
continued to publicly maintain his innocence and malign 
his accusers for over a year. These protestations were 
widely reported in the media and disseminated to the 
genera] public. He did so with full knowledge of his cul-
pability, as evidenced by his subsequent admission of 
[**I226] guilt. While we acknowledge Harding's right 
to remain silent and to vigorously defend himself against 
the criminal charges pending against him, his aggressive 
public statements themselves exacerbated the damage his 
conduct caused.1 
3 We also note that the comment to rule 8.4(d) 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that 
[HN9] "lawyers holding public office assume le-
gal responsibilities going beyond those of other 
citizens." Utah R. Professional Conduct 8.4(d) 
cmt. Indeed, "[a] lawyer's abuse of public office 
can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional 
role of attorney." Id Here, Harding's behavior 
demonstrates an inability to fulfill that role with 
the degree of fitness required to practice in this 
state. 
[***17] [*P24] Furthermore, despite being unable 
to hear cases due to the pending criminal charges, Hard-
ing continued to draw his full salary and otherwise en-
joyed the emoluments of judicial office. Not only did 
such behavior bring disrepute upon the legal profession 
and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, it 
placed an undue burden upon his colleagues on the 
Fourth District Court and adversely affected those citi-
zens served by that court. Compounding these abuses, 
Harding delayed his decision to resign until the last pos-
sible moment, and only did so under intense media cov-
erage of the looming dual threat of impeachment by the 
legislature and removal by this court. In sum, all of these 
acts, taken together, constitute conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and, given the circumstances 
surrounding their commission, merit disbarment in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P25] In light of the nature and circumstances sur-
rounding his misconduct, Ray Harding, Jr., is unfit to 
practice law in this state and is disbarred. 
[*P26] Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Jus-
tice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Associate 
Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion. 
